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The paper arose out of the authors' belief that economic principles
should, and probably will, play a larger role in the decisions of the new
Competition Tribunal. The objective of the paper is to clarify some of
the underlying assumptions and choices implicit in the regulation of
competitive behaviour by examining the literature on economic analysis
of market behaviour written by both economists and lawyers. The
authors are especially concerned with the recent emphasis on strategic
behaviour and its contrast to the Chicago school approach which
recommends less interference with market behaviour. They examine the
differences between the assumptions of both models and then consider
the implications for the regulation of exclusive dealing. In particular, the
authors examine the requirement that competition must be substantially
lessened, by developing two different approaches to a rule-of-reason test.
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I. OVERVIEW
This is a period of change for Canadian competition policy.
In June 1986, the Combines Investigation Act was renamed the
Competition Act and was extensively amended! In our view, these
changes presage a reassessment of the use of economic principles
in the regulation of anti-competitive conduct. The Act adopts terms
that appear to have an economic meaning such as "efficiency,"2
"barriers to entry,"3 and "effective competition."4 More significantly,
the Act shifts the regulation of several types of anti-competitive
conduct from criminal to civil law and from the courts to an
administrative body, the Competition Tribunal. It is to be expected
that the Tribunal's broad mandate will give it more opportunity to
develop a consistent competition policy based on economic
principles.
This paper will focus on the incorporation of economic
principles into the legal standards regulating vertical restraints.
I Competition Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-34 as amended. For a review of the amendments,
see XV. Grover & R. Kwinter, 'The New Competition Act" (1987) 66 Can. Bar Rev. 267.
2 See, for example, s. 96, which provides that the Tribunal shall not prevent a merger that
"...is likely to bring about gains in efficiency that will be greater than, and will offset, the
effects of any prevention or lessening of competition...."
3 Subsection 93(d) provides that in deciding whether a merger should be prevented, the
Tribunal may consider, among other factors, whether there are "any barriers to entry into a
market"
4 See, for example, s. 93(e), providing that in deciding whether to prevent a merger the
Tribunal may have regard to, among other factors, "...the extent to which effective competition
remains or would remain in a market that is or would be affected by the merger....:
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Competition policy on vertical restraints in the United States has
undergone an extensive review in recent years, due primarily to a
re-evaluation by economists of the impact of vertical restraints on
competition. It is our view that this economic and legal literature,
which brings into question the traditionally accepted rationale for
price and non-price vertical restraints, provides a foundation for the
development of specific legal criteria for the regulation of vertical
restraints under the Canadian Competition Act.
Our purpose is to further this process of adaptation of
economic principles by examining the regulation of the vertical
restraint of exclusive dealing under section 77 of the Competition
Act.5 This section provides that exclusive dealing is prohibited only
if it impedes expansion or entry, and results or is likely to result in
a substantial lessening of competition. Economic concepts are not
only relevant but fundamental to this inquiry. Examination of the
economic literature, however, reveals that there is a conflict over
the conditions under which exclusionary vertical restraints have an
adverse effect on competition. The following discussion examines
this conflict by developing four models of market behaviour and
tracing the implications for the interpretation of subsection 77(2) of
the Competition Act, which regulates exclusive dealing.
Section II of this article briefly describes the Canadian
legislation and then surveys the American jurisprudence. Section
III describes four models of market behaviour. Section IV examines
the economic rationale for regulating exclusive dealing. Section V
examines the anti-competitive effects predicted by the consumer
welfare model and the strategic behaviour model and compares their
underlying assumptions. Section VI, drawing on the previous
discussion, sets out conditions under which exclusive dealing results
or is likely to result in a "substantial lessening of competition," as
required by subsection 77(2) of the Competition Act. We conclude
that the recent work on strategies to raise rivals' costs provides
useful insight into the ways in which exclusionary conduct such as
exclusive dealing can foreclose supply and raise rivals' costs, and we
adopt some of the underlying assumptions of this approach.
5Section 97 also regulates tied selling. In the interests of clarity we have decided to
confine our remarks to exclusive dealing. A paper is forthcoming on tied selling.
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However, even if these assumptions are adopted, there is still a
decision whether to conduct an inquiry into the circumstances of
each case or to rely on presumptions which entail a less costly and
time consuming inquiry. We set out one possible structured legal
standard that would condemn exclusive dealing by a dominant firm
when there are entry barriers with no pro-competitive explanation,
and we contrast that standard to the inquiry mandated by a model
of strategies to raise rivals' costs.
II. LEGISLATION
A. Canadian Competition Act
"Vertical restraint" describes an arrangement between persons
or firms in a vertical relationship in the distribution or production
process. A supplier may restrict the freedom of a customer to
dispose of a product by requiring, for example, that the product be
sold at a particular price (resale price maintenance), to certain
customers (market restrictions), or from a certain location (exclusive
territories). Exclusive dealing arrangements require a customer to
deal exclusively in the supplier's product or a supplier to sell
exclusively to a customer.6  Vertical restraints also include
requirements by a supplier that a customer, in order to acquire one
product, buy another product from the supplier or its nominee.
This last practice is known as tied selling.
Exclusive dealing is regulated under section 77 of the
Competition Act, which was enacted as part of the Stage I
amendments in 1976. Subsection 77(2) provides:
Where, on application by the Director, the Tribunal finds that exclusive dealing or
tied selling, because it is engaged in by a major supplier of a product in a market
or because it is widespread in a market, is likely to
(a) impede entry into or expansion of a firm in the market,
(b) impede introduction of a product into or expansion of sales
of a product in the market, or
6 It should be noted the definition of exclusive dealing in subsection 77(1) of the
Competition Act does not include exclusive dealing imposed by a customer on a supplier.
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(c) have any other exclusionary effect in the market, with the
result that competition is or is likely to be lessened
substantially, the Tribunal may make an order... prohibiting
them from continuing to engage in such [conduct] and
containing any other requirement that ... is necessary to
overcome the effects thereof ....
Allegations that conduct violates section 77 are adjudicated by the
Competition Tribunal upon application by the Director of
Investigation and Research.7
Exclusive dealing agreements usually take two forms: (1)
supply contracts under which a buyer promises to make all or almost
all of its purchases from one supplier, and (2) output contracts in
which a supplier agrees to sell its entire output of a product to one
buyer. Form (2) is known as an exclusive distributorship. If the
customer purchases the product for use rather than resale, the
arrangement will be referred to as a requirements contract.
The definition of exclusive dealing in subsection 77(1)
requires that the exclusive dealing be imposed on the customer by
the supplier and therefore covers output contracts! It does not
include an exclusive dealing agreement in which the customer, for
example, requires that the supplier sell it its entire output.
However, the use of exclusive dealing by a dominant firm to pre-
7 Competition Tribunal Act, S.C. 1986, c.26.
8 Subsection 77(1) provides:
"exclusive dealing" means
(a) any practice whereby a supplier of a product, as a condition of supplying the
product to a customer, requires that customer to
(i) deal only or primarily in products supplied by or designated by the
supplier or his nominee, or
(ii) refrain from dealing in a specified class or kind of product except as
supplied by the supplier or his nominee, and
(b) any practice whereby a supplier of a product induces a customer to meet a
condition set out in subparagraph (a)(i) or (ii) by offering to supply the
product to him on more favourable terms or conditions if the customer agrees
to meet the condition set out in either of those subparagraphs.
In contrast, the United States Department of Justice, Vertical Distribution Restraints Guidelines,
50 Fed. Reg. 6263 (1985), set out the following definition: "Exclusive dealing arrangements
- requirements that a buyer deal only with a particular seller or that a seller deal only with
a particular buyer or group of buyers, including exclusive distributorships, sole outlet
provisions, and requirements contracts.
[voL 27 No. 4
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empt scarce facilities or resources required by a competitor is
regulated by section 78(e) of the Competition Act.9
The primary targets of the subsection 77(1) definition of
"exclusive dealing" are arrangements whereby a supplier requires a
dealer who resells the product not to deal in products which
compete with those of the supplier. Requirements contracts,
whereby a supplier requires a customer to use only or primarily the
products of the supplier as a condition of supply, will be caught only
if the phrase "deal ... in products supplied by ... the supplier ..." in
subsection 77(1) includes using the product as an input in the
production of another product.10
Reciprocal contracts whereby the supplier of product A
agrees to acquire all of its supply of product B from a customer on
Subsection 78(e) of the Competition Act regulates pre-emption of scarce resources by
a dominant firm. Subsection 78(f) prohibits overbuying by a dominant firm. Vertical price
squeezes by a vertically integrated dominant firm are prohibited by subsection 78(a). See S.
Salop & D. Scheffman, "Raising Rivals' Costs" (1983) 73 Amer. Econ. Rev. 267.
10 The issue is whether "deal" is equivalent to the concept of purchasing a product,
which connotes a single transaction, or whether "deal" requires a purchase and a subsequent
resale by the customer. (It should be noted that a sale is not required by the section. See
the definition of "supply' in section 2.) If a purchase is sufficient, then the customer deals
in the product when it acquires the product from the supplier. It is irrelevant whether the
customer uses the product as an input, consumes it, or resells it. However, the ordinary
meaning of "to deal" is to buy and sell a product. Thus it is natural to say that a firm which
buys and sells radios, deals in radios. But, a firm which buys transistors and makes radios is
not described as dealing in transistors. The ordinary meaning is reinforced by the wording
of the section which states that the supplier must require the customer "to deal...in products
supplied...by the supplier..." To deal in a product is to buy and sell a product, not merely to
buy the product. The phrase "dealing with a supplier" would be more consistent with an
interpretation that "deal" refers to the transaction between the supplier and the customer and
does not require a subsequent resale by the customer. Section 3 of the Clayton Act, infra,
note 13, covers requirement contracts and uses the words "on the condition ... that the ...
purchaser ... shall not use or deal in the goods ... of a competitor...." Section 77 does not
include a reference to using the product. On the other hand, the essence of exclusive dealing
is a restriction on purchasing, not resale. The customer must purchase all its requirements
from the supplier. In Empire Volkswagen, Inc v. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., [1986-1]
Trade Cases 66,939 (N.Y. Dist. Ct.) an agreement which required that a dealer sell only
volkswagen cars from a certain facility was held not to be an exclusive dealing arrangement
because the dealer was free to purchase from other car suppliers as long as it sold the cars
from other facilities. (See also White and White, Inc v. American Hospital Supply Corp. 540
F. Supp. 951 (W.D. Mich. 1982), 723 F.2d 495 (6th Cir. 1983)). It is more consistent with the
objectives of the section to include requirements contracts within the definition of exclusive
dealing, since some may have an anticompetitive effect. Since only those arrangements which
are anticompetitive may be subject to an order, there is little reason to eliminate all
requirements contracts from its operation.
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condition that the customer acquire all of its supply of product A
from the supplier or its nominee also are covered by section 77. In
this case the supplier of A is inducing the customer to deal only or
primarily in product A by offering to buy the customer's product
B. Market power in the buying side of the market is used to
coerce purchases of A. The result is that the purchaser of A will
deal exclusively in product A. n
Exclusive dealing may be illustrated by the only decision by
the Restrictive Trade Practices Commission (RTPc) on exclusive
dealing, Director of Investigation and Research v. Bombardier Ltd.12
Bombardier entered into exclusive dealing arrangements whereby
dealers in Bombardier snowmobiles agreed not to carry snowmobiles
produced by Bombardier's rivals. Bombardier had 30% of North
American sales, 60% in Quebec and the Maritimes, and 40% in
Ontario. Percentage of sales in local retail markets varied. The
RTPC upheld the legality of the exclusive dealing restrictions on the
basis that entry at the retail level was easy and rivals had not been
impeded from expanding.
B. American Legislation and Department of Justice Merger
Guidelines, 1982 and 1984
American experience with the regulation of vertical restraints
can provide guidance in the development of Canadian legal
standards. The literature contains extensive debates on the
application of economic principles in legal decision-making and on
whether these principles imply a rule of per se illegality, per se
legality, or a rule of reason. The case law contains examples of the
application of various forms of rules regulating vertical restraints.
Reciprocal dealing may be used to price discriminate. See D.G. McFetridge, 'The
Emergence of a Canadian Merger Policy:. The ERCO Case" (1974) Antitrust Bull. 1.
12 (1981), 53 C.P.R. (2d) 47 (R.T.P.C.).
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Exclusive dealing is regulated by section 3 of the Clayton Act 3  and
is evaluated under a rule of reason.
A development in American antitrust law which is a useful
source for developing standards under the Competition Act is the
issuing of the 1982 Merger Guidelines by the Department of Justice
to replace the merger guidelines issued in 1968.14 The 1982 Meiger
Guidelines incorporate economic theory on mergers into
enforcement policy. The principles of market definition and entry
barriers are drawn from economic thinking. The Guidelines set
threshold concentration levels that must be crossed before a merger
will be challenged. They differ from the 1968 Guidelines in that the
thresholds are higher and the market definition results in wider
markets and lower market shares. An additional set of merger
guidelines were issued in 1984.15 The 1984 Guidelines expand the
concept of market by including foreign production, expand the
failing company defence, and replace the threshold numerical
standards with a list of factors which are to be weighed. The 1982
Merger Guidelines in the vertical merger section provide useful
criteria for defining the market and measuring entry barriers,
particularly in the case of exclusive dealing which is equivalent on
many dimensions to vertical integration.
13 Section 3 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.A. Section 14, makes it unlawful for any firm
to sell or lease goods to be used, consumed or resold within a federal jurisdiction, or to offer
advantageous prices on the product, on the condition that the customer shall not use or deal
in the goods of a competitor of the supplier, if the effect of such sales or leases or offers may
be to lessen competition substantially in any relevant market. The specific reference to
restrictions on the use of goods incorporates requirements contracts. Tying or exclusive
dealing is also illegal under section 1 of the Shernan Act when there is an agreement between
firms.
14 47 Fed. Reg. 28,493 (1982). The 1968 Guidelines are reproduced at (1971), 2 Trade
Reg. Rep. para. 4500.
15 49 Fed. Reg. 26,824 (1984).
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III. MODELS OF MARKET BEHAVIOUR
A. Introduction
The Competition Act condemns behaviour that "substantially
lessens competition." A substantial lessening of competition will in
most cases have to be inferred from circumstantial evidence of the
conduct of firms and of market conditions rather than direct
evidence. Economic theory has developed models which predict the
impact of market structure and business behaviour on competition.
These models provide the generalizations from which inferences can
be drawn from evidence of markets and business practices. They
play the same role as conventional wisdom does in everyday life
where people draw inferences about behaviour from circumstantial
evidence. The generalization that an agreement to fix prices by all
the firms in a market will cause prices to rise is analogous to, for
example, the generalization that threats of harm cause recipients of
threats to feel fear and to commit acts against their will. In both
cases there is an inference as to the expected effects of the conduct.
The difference is that the first rests on a paradigm of behaviour not
generally known and requires expert explanation.
It should be kept in mind that economic theory undergoes a
process of simplification in its translation to the legal context.
Models implicitly adopted by courts are different from the models
applied by economists in that law uses models to classify conduct
rather than to analyze it 6  Courts tend not to check to see if
underlying assumptions of models coincide with the facts of the
individual case. This is one reason Professor Sullivan has
recommended that courts be wary of adopting any particular model
but rather rely on traditional legal criteria which are informed by
expert economic evidence! 7
16 R. Schmalensee, "On the Use of Economic Models in Antitrust: The ReaL emon
Case" (1979) 127 U. Pa. L. Rev. 994.
17 L.A. Sullivan, "Monopolization: Corporate Strategy, the IBM Cases, and the
Transformation of the Law" (1982) 60 Tex. L. Rev. 587 at 615.
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We recognize the validity of these criticisms and caution the
reader to view the following models from that perspective. We do
not advocate that any particular model should be assumed to be
"1correct." On the other hand, economic analysis provides a rich
source of information with which to evaluate conduct, and, in our
view, knowledge of this literature provides essential guidance for
correct classification of conduct as anti-competitive. The law does
not require certainty of facts but is content to make decisions on
the basis of propositions which fall short of scientific certainty.18
Economic models provide the initial generalizations - based on
extensive analysis - which can be tested against reality. The trier of
fact is free to adopt another scenario in the light of the evidence of
the particular case.
The market models described below reflect the different and
sometimes conflicting goals of competition law. Goals may be
classified as either economic or political. Political goals include
preserving small businesses, freedom of economic opportunity to
compete on the merits, decentralization of power, consumer choice
or consumer autonomy, distributional equity, and fairness in the
market place. The primary economic goals are allocative and
productive efficiency.19 Productive efficiency is concerned with
incurring the lowest costs of production (including opportunity costs)
given an array of goods and services that are to be produced.
Allocative efficiency requires that the array of goods and services to
be produced and the distribution of these goods and services to the
consumers be chosen in a manner that maximizes welfare. Ensuring
18 Alexander, An Introduction to Logic (N.Y.: Shocker Books, 1969) at 61. He describes
the law as using interpretative arguments. "When a court ascribes responsibility for an action
or decides that there was negligence this is not the conclusion of a deductive or an inductive
argument. Neither is it a clear statement of fact. It is an interpretation of the facts and it
may be controversial"
19 There is a difference of opinion among advocates of the goal of maximizing consumer
welfare whether to adopt a static or a dynamic view. Some advocate a short-run static analysis
to determine whether allocative efficiencies exist. Others espouse a dynamic framework which
assesses the long-run and short-run tradeoffs involved in determining efficiencies. See A.A.
Foer, "The Political-Economic Nature of Antitrust" (1983) 27 St. Louis Univ. L. 3. 331.
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the optimal amount of consumer choice is an aspect of allocative
efficiency.20
The general argument underlying the economic goals is that
consumers benefit from a competitive market in which rival firms
bid down prices as they compete for market share. In the absence
of market failure or large economies of scale, intense rivalry among
many sellers results in the lowest possible prices for consumers and
an efficient quantity of production. The interests of the consumer
are often undermined when there are few sellers, because the
absence of rivals confers power on the few sellers to maintain
higher prices and to obtain greater profits at the expense of the
consumer and of efficiency. Thus, market share and its frequent
consequence, market power or the ability to affect prices in the
market, are important factors in assessing the performance of a
market.
Market share alone, however, does not confer market power
upon its holder. Market power can be restrained by the presence
of potential entrants into the market. Whether potential entrants
exist is determined by the size and nature of the barriers to entry
in the industry. Examples of barriers to entry are cost advantages
to incumbent firms through access to superior technology or
exclusive supply of low cost inputs, product differentiation and brand
loyalty, economies of large scale, and large initial investment costs.21
Although many of these can be short-run barriers, most can be
overcome with sufficient financial resources, and they often concern
costs which have been paid by existing firms in the industry. Thus,
the barriers provide the incumbent firms (which are usually
financially healthier than potential entrants) with at least a
temporary advantage. Such advantages often translate into larger
market shares or greater entrenchment of barriers to entry. In the
presence of market power, vertical restraints such as exclusive
dealing can sometimes confer further market power or create entry
barriers. Therefore, market structure and entry barriers figure
20C
20 The broad areas of location theory and heterogeneous product markets are where
economists study this\issue.
21 We are adopting a broader definition of entry barriers than that advocated by the
consumer welfare model. See discussion infra, notes 122-26.
720 [VOL 27 No. 4
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prominently in the discussion of the economic effects of vertical
restraints.
In the Canadian context, it is particularly important to
consider total welfare. With very small markets dispersed over large
geographic areas, there is often insufficient demand to support many
competitive producers at an efficient scale. The trade-off is
between a few large low-cost producers with substantial market
power or many small competitive, but inefficient, firms.22 Thus
economic efficiency is not always achieved through decentralization.
Consumers' interests can sometimes be better served when a few
firms (or even one firm) make oligopoly profits. For example, the
oligopoly price will be below the price that would be offered by a
competitive industry when each firm in the competitive industry
operates at such a small scale of production that it is not able to
avail itself of substantial economies of scale.
The political goals which may be classified under the rubric
of preventing high concentration are generally not taken into
account in economic models, although it is feasible to include a
component in the objective functions that reflects the political
threat of economic power. Similarly while consumer choice is an
aspect of allocative efficiency, critics of economic legal standards
adopt the preservation of consumer choice as a separate goal of
competition law.23 The deconcentration model described below
adopts decentralization and its corollaries of consumer choice and a
concern for distributional consequences as a primary goal. It has
also been argued that political goals are emphasized when a dynamic
view which examines conduct over time is adopted, as in the
strategic behaviour model, because such a view recognizes that firms
have discretion and that their conduct is not simply a reaction to
market forces.24
22 C.E. Williamson, "Assessing Vertical Market Restrictions: Antitrust Ramifications
of the Transaction Cost Approach" (1979) 127 U. Pa. L. Rev. 953.
23 E.M. Fox, "The Modernization of Antitrust: A New Equilibrium" (1981) 66 Cornell
L. Rev. 1140.
24 A firm's decisions affect individuals, communities, and society. Foer argues that it
is important "to see the relevance of the political non-efficiency goals of antitrust. Power is
going to be exercised, whether by private, public, or a mixture of these forces. To the extent
that reliance on the efficiency criteria results in elimination of governmental oversight and
intervention, a very significant political decision has been made." Foer, supra, note 19 at 337.
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B. Four Models of Market Behaviour
1. Structuralist model
The objective of the structuralist model is to maximize
consumer welfare. The structuralist model assumes that business
conduct which harms competition can be identified by examining the
type of market structure in which the conduct occurs. It assumes
that the higher profit levels experienced in concentrated industries
are due to collusion.25 This is the general conclusion of the
structure-conduct-performance paradigm which holds that it is
ultimately the market structure that affects consumer welfare.2 6 The
casualty runs in the following direction: structure induces conduct
that determines performance. For example, a low concentration
market structure with many firms induces healthy competition with
the lowest possible prices. This causes the maximization of
consumer welfare: an efficient amount is supplied without supra-
competitive profits. Similarly, it is assumed that high concentration
results in restriction of output and raising of prices causing supra-
normal profits, supply of less than an efficient quantity, and a
reduction in consumer welfare. The goal of the structuralist model,
thus, is to control market concentration and to maintain an atomistic
market.
The structuralist model leads to concern about the number
of firms in an industry. Conduct which forecloses competitors or
increases concentration may be classified as illegal without any
assessment of the impact on output or price based on the
assumption that conduct is determined by structure. For example,
the 1968 Merger Guidelines of the United States Department of
Justice used market share percentages to determine when a merger
25 Werden, "Can the Concentration-Collusion Hypothesis be Refuted Empirically?"
(United States Depart. of Justice, Economic Policy Office 84-11, 1984) (Addressing the
literature that concludes there is little empirical support for the concentration-collusion
hypothesis and concluding that despite this lack of evidence, a restrictive merger policy may
be welfare enhancing.)
2 6 F.M. Scherer, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance (Chicago: Rand
McNally, 1980) at 3-6.
[VOL 27 No. 4
Market Behaviour and Competition Law
would be challenged. Similarly, the 1981 proposals to amend the
Combines Investigation Act recommended that mergers and joint
monopoly should be illegal per se if the combined market share was
above some threshold level.27 The structuralist model has been
described as the "inhospitability tradition7' 8 because novel market
practices such as tied selling or exclusive dealing are assumed to be
motivated by anti-competitive purposes, and thus, illegal per se
without requiring that the practice be shown to be anti-competitive.
The model's underlying assumption that structure determines
conduct has been viewed as too simplistic in the light of the failure
to find empirical support for a causal connection between
concentration and profitability.29  While highly concentrated
industries are profitable, the empirical evidence does not show that
profitability is necessarily due to collusion.30 High profitability could
be caused by economies of scale, innovation, cost reductions,
historically lower costs, et cetera.
Canadian competition law has never adopted a pure
structural approach, but has required proof that conduct in the
particular case has harmed competition. The structuralist approach
is more clearly rejected in the recent amendments to the
Competition Act3 1 For example, the merger provisions provide that
a merger cannot be condemned solely on the basis of evidence of
concentration or market share,32 and the provisions create an
efficiency defence which would permit a merger where efficiency
gains offset the effects of any lessening of competition. The abuse
27 Consumer and Corporate Affairs, Reform of Competition Policy in Canada: A
Consultation Paper, March, 1985.
28 Williamson, supra, note 22 at 989.
29 H. Demsetz, "Industry Structure, Market Rivalry, and Public Policy" (1973) 16 J. Law
& Econ. 1; Y. Bozen, "Bain's Concentration and Rates of Return Revisited" (1971) 14 J. Law
& Econ. 351.
30 Werden, supra, note 25.
31 Compare the proposed 1981 amendments to the Combines Investigation Act, supra,
note 27. (Proposed a structural test: mergers and joint monopolies were to be illegal per se
if combined market share was above some uniform threshold. It did not recognize an
efficiency defence.)
32 Supra, note 1, s. 92(2).
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of dominant position provisions require evidence of a specific intent
to exclude or harm a rival.33
2. Deconcentration model
This model differs from the other models: its goals are to
avoid extreme concentrations of economic power in large
corporations and protect the consumer from exercises of monopoly
power, and to maximize consumer welfare. It is recognized that
these two goals may conflict. In some instances increases in
concentration may create efficiencies which make the consumer
better off than under a less concentrated market structure. In these
instances, proponents of this model are willing to trade increases in
efficiency for a market structure in which political and economic
power is not concentrated in the hands of a few large corporations.
There is a fear that excessive concentration will breed anti-
democratic political pressures and will reduce individual and business
freedom by broadening the range within which private discretion by
a few in the economic sphere controls the welfare of all.34 When
the goals of consumer welfare and diffusion of political power
conflict under this model, consumer welfare is sacrificed to the goal
of decentralization of economic and political power. Professor
Pitofsky states: "[Tlhe matter of efficiencies is not dispositive, and
... an occasional loss of efficiency as a result of antitrust
enforcement can be tolerated and is to be expected if antitrust is to
serve other legitimate values."35 In addition to the political values
of deconcentration, Professor Schumpeter has argued that near-
atomistic markets encourage innovation.36 For example, it is argued
that over time independent suppliers of a tied product would be
33/bid, s. 78.
34 See R. Pitofsky, 'The Political Content of Antitrust" (1979) 127 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1051
at 1074.
35 Ibid. at 1074.
36 J.A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, 3d ed. (New York: Harper
& Row, 1975). (Dynamic efficiency is improved through rapid technological change which is
most likely with a structure of loose oligopoly.)
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strongly motivated to innovate in order to reduce the power of the
tying product monopolist. 37
Proponents of a deconcentration model believe that in most
cases it will not be necessary to trade efficiency for deconcentration
because in their view economies of scale are not substantial.38 In
any event, they are skeptical that efficiencies can be quantified.
This uncertainty, in combination with a belief that entry barriers are
large and easily manipulated and that pricing above marginal costs
occurs at relatively low concentration levels, implies that lower
concentration levels should be maintained unless efficiencies are
clearly shown.3
9
Proponents of a deconcentration approach also advocate
preserving or increasing consumer choice and competitive
opportunities. Exclusive dealing is criticized on the ground that it
reduces the price/quality options available to consumers.4 ° Similarly,
they see the sole role of the rules regulating tied selling to be the
protection of a fair opportunity to compete on the merits.41
An example of the application of the deconcentration model
are the National Association of Attorneys General (NAAG) vertical
L.A. Sullivan, Handbook of the Law of Antibust (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing,
1977) at 447-48. In Paschall v. Kansas City Star 695 F.2d 332 (8th Cir.) (reversed on
rehearing 727 F.2d 265, cert. denied 105 US 406 (1984)), the court in considering vertical
integration of a newspaper publisher into distribution stated that although the integration
"might theoretically lead to pro-competitive results...it nevertheless may be beneficial to
preserve competition at the retail level because competitors are often more efficient or
innovative than monopolists."
38 J.S. Bain, "Economies of Scale, Concentration, and the Condition of Entry in Twenty
Manufacturing Industries" (1954) 44 Amer. Econ. Rev. 15. See H. Goldschmid, M. Mann &
J.F. Weston eds, Industrial Concentration: The New Learning (Boston: Little, Brown, 1974).
See also Fox, supra, note 23.
39 See H. Hovenkamp, "Antitrust Policy after Chicago" (1985) 84 Mich. L Rev. 213 at
218.
40 See F.M. Scherer, '"he Economics of Vertical Restraints" (1983) 52 Antitrust LJ.
687. (Vertical restraint does not necessarily result in increase in output, but may decrease
demand and, for example, restrict the set of low price/service choices, or result in smaller
outlets.) See W.S. Comanor, "Vertical Price-Fixing, Vertical Market Restrictions, and the New
Antitrust Policy" (1985) 98 Harv. L. Rev. 983.
41 Fox, supra, note 23.
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restraints guidelines42 issued in response to the Department of
Justice's Vertical Restraints Guidelines. NAAG advocates per se
illegality for horizontal restraints which they define more broadly
than the Department of Justice. High concentration and coverage
are not necessary conditions, although they are a factor in the
decision. NAAG believes that elimination of intra-brand competition
is usually harmful, and that product differentiation can be used as a
mechanism to avoid price competition. It does not assume that
restraints are efficient and would examine the motivations for a
restraint, asking, for example, whether a supplier requires dealers to
supply additional services.43
3. Consumer welfare model
The consumer welfare model prohibits only those practices
which confer power to reduce output and increase price.44  Its
primary goal is to maximize consumer welfare by maximizing
productive efficiency and confirming the benefits of lower prices for
42 National Association of Attorneys General (NAAG), Vertical Restraints Guidelines
Winter Meeting, Biloxi, Mississippi, December 4, 1985, reproduced in Bureau of National
Affairs, 49 Antitrust & Trade Regulation Report 996 (12-5-85).
43 For example, NAAG adopts the American case law which holds that tying is illegal
per se if a substantial volume of commerce is foreclosed or the supplier has sufficient market
power to make forcing probable. It sets out separate factors for assessing tying arrangements
which are not per se illegal under this standard:
1. The extent of product differentiation of the tied product (inelasticity of demand
approaching "market power").
2. Whether the tying arrangement is widely adopted in the tying product industry and
whether entry barriers are high.
3. The effect on the number of buyer options.
4. The simultaneous use of an exclusive dealing arrangement for purchase of the tied
product.
5. Miscellaneous factors.
44 See, for example, R.H. Bork, Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself (New York:
Basic Books, 1978); Easterbrook, "On Identifying Exclusionary Conduct" (1986) 61 Notre
Dame L Rev. 972.
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consumers.45 Practices which make a market more concentrated do
not necessarily confer market power since firms in higher
concentrated markets often compete fiercely. Increased
concentration may also result in efficiencies which benefit consumers
in the form of lower prices or better products or services. The goal
is to protect competition, not competitors. Therefore increases in
market concentration are not condemned per se, but the conduct in
each case must be analyzed to determine its legality. Furthermore,
the model would not prohibit a practice which increases output or
lowers price even though industry concentration is increased. It is
expected that "[v]igorous competition 'excludes' rivals."46  The
consumer welfare school would not prohibit a dominant firm from
foreclosing competitors from a significant segment of the market
unless that foreclosure conferred power on the dominant firm to
reduce output and raise prices. There is no objection if all rivals
leave the market when entry barriers are low, since competing firms
can readily enter the market if the dominant firm raises prices.
The conflict between the structuralist school and the
consumer welfare school first arose over the analysis of vertical
restraints.47  For example, the structuralist model with its
"inhospitability tradition" assumed the motivation for tying is to
extend market power into a second market, and therefore would
classify tying as per se illegal. The consumer welfare school
examined the motivations more closely and concluded that in most
cases tying is ineffective in leveraging monopoly power and is often
motivated by other goals which have a pro-competitive or at least a
neutral effect on competition. In contrast to the "inhospitability
tradition" of antitrust law, the consumer welfare model assumed that
vertical restraints are seldom anti-competitive. On the other hand,
critics of the consumer welfare school questioned its underlying
Bork, ibid. at 91, defines this goal as "... to improve allocative efficiency without
impairing productive efficiency so greatly as to produce either no gain or a net loss in
consumer welfare." It must be noted, however, that with regard to allocative efficiency the
emphasis is largely on how different market structures affect allocative efficiency and not on
the existence of adequate choice for consumers.
46 Easterbrook, supra, note 44 at 973.
47 R.A. Posner, '"he Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis" (1979) 127 U. Pa. L. Rev.
925 at 938-39.
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assumption that the private interests of the firms entering into the
restrictive agreement and the public interests of the consumer
always coincide.48 They also pointed out that the consumer welfare
model does not give weight to the degree to which consumer choice
of price/quality options are reduced.49
Advocates of the consumer welfare model concluded that
vertical restraints including exclusive dealing should be legal per se.50
Any anti-competitive effects such as collusion or monopolization
should be regulated under legislation explicitly directed at that
conduct.
The Vertical Restraints Guidelines issued by the United States
Department of Justice in January 1985 are an example of the
application of the consumer welfare model. Vertical restraints are
assumed rarely to have a significant anti-competitive effect and are
permitted, even if the initial threshold tests of market share indicate
that collusion or exclusion is possible, should the market appear to
be functioning competitively or exclusion or collusion is not likely.51
Efficiencies, while not necessary, indicate that a pro-competitive
explanation for the restraint is plausible.5 2 The Vertical Restraint
Guidelines adopt the underlying assumption of the consumer
48 See, for example, E.M. Fox, "Consumer Beware Chicago" (1986) 84 Mich. L. Rev.
1714.
49 See Scherer, supra, note 40.
50 Bork, supra, note 44; Posner, 'The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted
Distrubition: Per Se Legality" (1981) 40 U. Chi. L. Rev. 6.
51 United States Dept. of Justice, Vertical Restraints Guidelines, 50 Fed. Reg. 6263 (1985),
Para. 4.2. The Guidelines employ a two-step process to analyze vertical restraints. Step one
is the market structure screen which will eliminate vertical restraints by firms with small
market shares, restraints by firms in unconcentrated markets, and restraints which do not
cover "a substantial percentage of the sales or capacity in the secondary (foreclosed) market."
(Para. 4.1.) The Guidelines adopt a Vertical Restraints Index (VRI) to measure the market
share of the firm employing the restraint (both the supplier and the dealer) and the level of
concentration in the same market. They also adopt the concept of a "coverage ratio" which
is "the percent of each market involved in a restraint." (Para. 4.1) Restraints which are not
eliminated in step one are evaluated under a structured rule of reason analysis to determine
if the restraint is likely to have an adverse effect on competition.
52 Ibid. at para 4.226.
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welfare model that manufacturers who impose vertical restraints will
generally be acting in the consumer's best interests.5 3
The debate between the deconcentration school and the
consumer welfare school also centers around alternative approaches
to efficiency claims. Should such claims be a complete or partial
defence and if so, where should the burden of proof lie? Should
some conduct be presumed to be efficient under certain conditions?
Professor Pitofsky argued that efficiencies could often be achieved
by means of contract or internal expansion and do not necessarily
result in competitive pressure on rivals. At most, Professor Pitofsky
was willing to recognize an exception for evidence of efficiencies
"when the likelihood of competitive injuries was slight, the predicted
efficiencies were capable of clear demonstration in court, and there
was some likelihood that the efficiencies would be converted into
significant competitive effects."54  The consumer welfare school
believes that efficient conduct is probable and argues that
efficiencies or at least no anti-competitive effect should be
presumed if the conduct does not confer power over price and
output.
The debate about the role of efficiency is reflected in the
approach taken to the issue of whether existing competition should
be protected from the effects of a vertical restraint. Almost all
agree that the small inefficient competitor seeking to survive under
the price umbrella of a dominant firm should not be protected by
competition laws.s5 There is also general agreement that vertical
The validity of this assumption was one of the factors underlying the criticism of the
Vertical Restraints Guidelines by the United States House of Representatives. On November
21, 1985, the US House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary approved and
recommended passage of House Resolution 303. The Resolution expressed the "sense of the
House of Representatives that the antitrust enforcement guidelines entitled "Vertical Restraints
Guidelines", published by the Department of Justice on January 23, 1985, do not have the
force of law, do not accurately state current antitrust law, and shall not be considered by the
courts of the United States as binding or persuasive..."(Report of the House Judiciary
Committee, 99th Congress, 1st session, no. 99-399.)
54 Pitofsky, supra, note 34 at 1075.
55 See discussion of Pitofsky, supra, note 34, who states he advocates the protection not
of "small inefficient competitors", but of competition. Small competitors are only protected
against "unfair tactics unrelated to superior skill or efficiency." Protection of competitors
conflicts with the goal of equality of opportunity through the limitation of private discretion
in that it would confer political power on a minority. Part IV.I originated partly in the
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restraints which confer power over price and output should be
prohibited. The difficult case is the claim of a competitor that a
rival's acts foreclosed it from competing for significant segments of
the market although the acts did not confer power over output or
prices in the classical sense 5 6 In this case, many proponents of a
deconcentration model would dispute the hypothesis of the
consumer welfare model that acts which do not increase market
power are efficient and would protect the competitor on the
reasoning that if the conduct is not shown to be efficient nothing
is lost by preserving competitors in the market.
4. Strategic behaviour model
The strategic behaviour model reflects the concerns of those
who advocate a more careful analysis of the conditions under which
vertical restraints are anti-competitive. Rather than assume as the
consumer welfare school does that vertical restraints are efficient or
neutral, some commentators have developed models which take into
account strategic conduct which has the aim of imposing costs on
rivals. While the consumer welfare model assumes costless
transactions, these commentators, notably Oliver Williamson and
Steven Salop, incorporate transaction costs into their analysis.5 7
Recognizing transaction costs leads to the possibility of strategic
behaviour (that is, conduct which puts rivals and potential entrants
at a disadvantage). If there are no transaction costs, strategic
behaviour is meaningless because it will have no effect.58 Professor
Economic Council of'Canada's Interim Report on Competition Policy (Ottawa: Queen's Printer,
1969). The report recommended that tied selling and exclusive dealing, among other practices,
should be scrutinized and prohibited when the practice "was likely to lessen competition to the
detriment of final consumers. Not the interest of particular competitors but the interest of
ultimate purchasers would be paramount."
56 See E.M. Fox, "Monopolization and Dominance in the United States and the European
Community:. Efficiency, Opportunity, and Fairness" (1986) 61 Notre Dame L. Rev. 981 at
1020.
.57 Williamson, supra, note 22 at 962; S. Salop, "Strategic Entry Deterrence" (1979) Am.
Econ. Rev. 335; S. Salop & D. Scheffman, "Cost-Raising Strategies" (F.T.C. Working Paper
No. 146, July, 1986). See also Scherer, supra, note 40.
58 Williamson, ibid. at 990.
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Williamson defines strategic behaviour as "efforts by established
firms to take up advance positions and respond contingently to
rivalry in ways that discipline actual and discourage potential
competition."5 9
Strategic behaviour is, in fact, no different from the usual
optimization behaviour in modern economic models. The only
difference is that the strategic behaviour models allow the existence
of more complex information conditions and more realistic
assumptions about costs. This difference often results in optimization
behaviour by a firm that is disadvantageous for rivals. In particular,
it is assumed that the environment in which firms operate is
uncertain, often with asymmetric information among firms. In
addition, bounded rationality or at least costs of learning are
assumed. Professor Williamson refers to all such factors as
transaction costs. The existence of transaction costs provides a
further complication in identifying the conditions under which
actions based on self-interest serve the public interest.
Transaction costs analysis both attacks and supports vertical
restraints. A supplier who contracts with a view to reducing its own
transaction costs is acting efficiently. A supplier may, however,
impose a vertical restraint with a view to increasing a rival's costs
and causing anti-competitive effects.
In vertical restraints arrangements, transaction costs arise
from human asset and capital market restrictions. It is possible to
impede entry by "differential cost bearing consequences. '' ° Thus,
the timing of the imposition of costs can put rivals at a disadvantage
by imposing costs on them that are not incurred by the incumbent
firm. For example, if learning by doing is an important factor, a
firm which enters later will require time to learn by doing if it
cannot bid employees from the incumbent. The incumbent will be
able to charge lower prices if prices closely track costs. Capital
costs will be an impediment to entry if investors demand a premium
to invest in a new enterprise because of the uncertainty of success
59 O.E. Williamson, "Antitrust Enforcement: Where It's Been, Where It's Going" (1983)
27 St. Louis U. LJ. 289; Hovenkamp, supra, note 39 at 260 defines strategic behaviour as
"...conduct designed by the actor to reduce the attractiveness of the offers against which it
must compete."
60 Williamson, supra, note 22.
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and the possibility of opportunistic behaviour.61 This is in contrast
to the emphasis of the consumer welfare model on long-run
behaviour which leads it to assume that assets are freely transferable
from one firm to another.62 Thus the strategic behaviour model
expands the definition of entry barriers to include impediments to
entry.
Transaction costs analysis supports the imposition of vertical
restraints by providing explanations which are pro-competitive or at
least neutral. For example, if the transaction costs of a scheme
whereby all suppliers distribute their products through all dealers are
very high due to transportation or negotiation costs, exclusive
dealing may be efficient and, thus, pro-competitive.
The strategic behaviour model has the same goal as the
consumer welfare model: the maximization of consumer welfare.
Neither model values deconcentration or increases in consumer
choice for its own sake, as the deconcentration model does. The
principal question is still whether vertical restraints confer market
power with the result that total output is reduced and price is
raised. The strategic behaviour model, however, does elaborate the
conditions under which market power is enhanced by examining
strategic purpose and effect, and is less willing than the consumer
welfare model to assume that vertical restraints are pro-competitive.
Therefore, the application of the strategic behaviour model may
result in less concentrated markets. Incorporating strategic
behaviour increases the complexity of the analysis and makes it
more difficult to classify behaviour as unequivocally efficient. For
this reason, advocates of the consumer welfare model such as
William Baxter have argued that even if strategic behaviour does
occur, the courts are not equipped to understand it and therefore it
should be ignored.63
61 Williamson, supra, note 22 defines opportunistic behaviour as acting in your self-
interest with guile. For example, an entrant may misrepresent the risks of the investment.
Discovery of the misrepresentation will be unlikely if there are few competitors for the
investment funds.
62 Hovenkamp, supra, note 39 at 264.
63 W.F. Baxter, "Reflections Upon Professor Williamson's Comments" (1983) 27 St.
Louis U. L. Rev. 315.
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Advocates of the deconcentration model acknowledge the
usefulness of the strategic behaviour model in providing support for
the traditional legal insight that exclusionary conduct directed at
rivals can be a realistic threat64. In their view, however, the
strategic behaviour model is not so much a "new" model as it is an
elaboration of the consumer welfare model in that its primary
concern is also whether firms have gained the ability to limit total
output.65  They argue that antitrust legislation is not directed
towards the solitary goal of productive efficiency but is also
concerned with consumer choice, diversity, freedom to compete, and
innovation which are elements of allocative efficiency.66
To summarize, the strategic behaviour model sets the
interaction among firms in a realistic environment where there is
uncertainty and asymmetric information. It is concerned with the
dynamic effects of firms' actions. Thus an action by a firm resulting
in a short-run advantage may in the long run be a permanent set-
back for its rivals. Moreover, it abandons the classical assumption
that assets are costlessly malleable and that markets are complete in
favour of the more realistic notion that there are transaction costs
associated with divesting specific-use assets. Finally, in the world of
very complex transactions, decision-makers have bounded rationality
and this permits opportunistic behaviour on the part of firms that
have some sort of advantage.
The raising rivals' costs model which is described below is
an example of a model which incorporates strategic conduct into an
assessment of the anti-competitive effects of vertical restraints.
Under this model, strategic behaviour by a dominant firm or group
of firms can impose relatively higher costs on rivals, resulting in
higher profits for the dominant firm(s).
Sullivan, supra, note 17 at 622.
65 Ibid.
66 Fox, supra, note 23.
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C. Competition Act
The recently enacted Competition Act amendments do not
fit easily into the structuralist, deconcentration or consumer welfare
model. They reject a structuralist approach by, for example,
providing that a merger may not be condemned solely on the basis
of increase in concentration or market share.67  As between the
deconcentration and consumer welfare models, classification depends
on the views of the Competition Tribunal on the conditions
necessary for efficiency gains, entry barriers, and monopoly pricing.
The Act requires a balancing of gains from efficiency against losses
from decreases in competition. For example, the Act would permit
a substantial lessening of competition brought about by a merger if
the Competition Tribunal finds that the merger has brought about
or is likely to bring about "gains in efficiency that will be greater
than, and will offset, the effects of any preventing or lessening of
competition" and the gains would not exist if merger did not
occur.68 If the Tribunal assumes that economies of scale are a
likely result of a merger or that pricing above marginal cost is
unlikely at low concentration levels, it will be leaning toward the
consumer welfare model. On the other hand, it could be skeptical
about the existence of efficiencies and the efficacy of potential
competition in preventing price rises.
There is some support in the Competition Act for the
deconcentration model. Concerns about deconcentration are evident
in the 1986 amendments which state that one of the purposes of
the Act is to "maintain and encourage competition ... in order to
ensure that smalf and medium-sized enterprises have an equitable
opportunity to participate in the Canadian economy."69 Small
businesses are not to be protected for their own sake. The Guide
67 Section 92(2) provides that the Tribunal shall not find that a merger lessened
competition substantially "solely on the basis of evidence of concentration or market share."
68 TheAct appears to adopt a modification of the approach of Williamson: 'The Welfare
Tradeoffs" (1968) 58 Am. Econ. Rev. 18. The literature on tradeoffs between efficiency and
dead weight welfare losses is criticized in A.A. Fisher & R.H. Lande, "Efficiency
Considerations in Merger Enforcement" (1983) 71 Cal. L. Rev. 1580.
69 Supra, note 1, s. 1.1.
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to the Competition Act amendments states that "if competitors fall
from the market because a dominant competitor is more effective in
meeting consumers' needs, this is not an abuse of market power, but
rather a natural consequence of the competitive process."70  The
value of consumer choice is also recognized in the statement of
purpose, which states that one aim in encouraging competition is
"to provide consumers with competitive prices and product choices."
However, in our view the Act is more consistent with economic
models of behaviour because of its emphasis on the trade-off
between competition and efficiency, its concern for innovation,71 and
its prohibition of conduct which creates entry barriers.
Section 77 which regulates exclusive dealing may be viewed
in this context. By rejecting a per se illegality rule for exclusive
dealing, the section departs from the tradition of inhospitability to
the novel business behaviour of the structuralist model. By
requiring that the practice substantially lessen competition, the Act
recognizes that the impact of the restraint may be pro or anti-
competitive in contrast to the consumer welfare model which
advocated a per se legal rule. In our view the section when read
within the context of the Act as a whole is most consistent with the
strategic behaviour model, which emphasizes the effect of the
restraint in the real world.
IV. ECONOMIC RATIONALE FOR REGULATING
EXCLUSIVE DEALING
A. Overview
If exclusive dealing always had an anti-competitive effect, it
should be prohibited in every case. Economic analysis has shown,
however, that in many cases exclusive dealing has a neutral or even
a pro-competitive effect. The pro-competitive effects from vertical
70 Ministry of Consumer and Corporate Affairs, Guide at 22-23. It should be noted that
the centralist model does not protect small competitors for their own sake or advocate
inefficient outcomes. See Fox, supra, note 23.
71 Supra, note 1, s. 93(g).
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restraints are usually due to a reduction of transaction costs or the
elimination of externalities. Because of these decreases in costs, the
firm is better able to compete with its rivals, and this results in
efficiency gains. The behaviour of the firm exercising the vertical
restraint is kept in check whenever there are rivals not engaged in
the vertical restraint. If consumers are unhappy with the vertical
policy of a firm (because their choice is limited), they are free to
purchase from the rivals. Thus, a firm implementing vertical
restraints in the presence of competitors must experience costs
savings that are sufficiently large to offset any consumer
dissatisfaction. Anti-competitive effects occur when there are few
(or no) rivals. Without many rivals, the firm has greater control
over its price since the consumer's alternatives are limited.
The Competition Act which requires a showing that the
practice substantially lessens competition is consistent with this
general analysis of vertical restraints. Developing a standard
requires an understanding of the pro- and anti-competitive effects of
the practice.
B. Pro-competitive or Ambiguous Effects
Exclusive dealing may reduce inter-brand free-riding on the
promotional efforts of the supplier. The supplier may be motivated
to spend more on promotion because exclusive dealing prevents
free-riding on suppliers' advertising and services. Professor Marvel
gives the example of large life insurance companies that advertise
widely and maintain a large sales force to signal the existence of
insurance to the consumer, who goes to an agent to purchase the
insurance.72 If the agent represented both informing firms and
non-informing firms, the non-informing firms could underprice the
informing firms and thus free-ride on the efforts of the informing
firms. Similarly, exclusive dealing by car manufacturers which
requires that car dealers carry the parts of the manufacturer may
72 H. Marvel, "Exclusive Dealing" (1982) 25 J. Law & Econ. 1.
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prevent free-riding on the brand name of the manufacturer. 73
Dealers may be motivated to promote the product because their
own success is tied to the success of the only brand it carries. A
dealer which carries more than one brand will be indifferent as to
which brand is sold as long as the margins are the same.
Requirements contracts, by allocating risks among the
parties, may minimize costs and make projects feasible. For
example, an agreement by a supplier to provide continuous supply
over a long period of time protects the customer against short-term
shortages. The supplier may charge for this service by extracting a
higher price or by requiring that the customer purchase all of its
requirements from the supplier. The most efficient option, in many
cases, may be the requirements contract.74
Exclusive dealing may result in lower wholesale prices. Since
suppliers must compete for retailers through wholesale contracts
which may or may not require exclusive dealing, the supplier will
have to lower the wholesale price to induce the dealer to deal
exclusively in the products of the supplier. Exclusive dealing which
results in a higher margin between wholesale and resale price may
motivate dealers to expend more effort on promotion, carry larger
inventories, and provide maintainance and repair service. Professors
Mathewson and Winter frame the question as whether "any
reduction in wholesale prices to capture existing retailers generate[s]
sufficient benefits to outweigh the reduction in product choice [by
the consumer]."75 They conclude that retail prices may be lower if
potential competition indicated by the number of substitutes (for
example) is high.
Exclusive dealing may protect trade secrets. For instance, in
the absence of exclusive dealing, a distributor could use the market
strategies of one supplier to benefit another.
P. Mathewson & Winter, "The Economics of Vertical Restrictions" (Working paper,
Law and Economic Programme, U. of Toronto, 1984) at 72.
74 P. Areeda, Antitrust Analysis, Problems, Texv Cases, 3d ed. (Toronto: Little, Brown,
1981) at 811. It should be noted requirements contracts imposed by the customer are not
caught by s. 77.
75 Mathewson & Winter, supra, note 73 at 81.
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Exclusive dealing may facilitate the entry of a new producer
into a market. A new producer may be able to recover its initial
developmental costs through exclusive dealing. Exclusive dealing
may permit a small, entering supplier to obtain the services of
dealers and help build its reputation. Subsection 77(4)(a) provides
a defence for exclusive dealing or market restriction which is used
to facilitate the new entry of a product or firm into a market.
C. Anti-competitive Effects
There are two anti-competitive affects of exclusive dealing:
facilitation of collusion and foreclosure of rivals. Section 49
regulates both exclusive dealing and tied selling. This is consistent
with economic theory because the two practices are similar in their
effects on the consumer and other firms in the market. Exclusive
dealing is essentially a special type of tied selling where the
consumer can purchase the product of a particular manufacturer
only in connection with the services of a dealer that is authorized by
the manufacturer. In effect, there is a bundling of product and
dealer which is a type of tied selling.
A difference between the two, often observed in practice, is
that tying usually occurs between two products of an integrated firm
while exclusive dealing is between unintegrated firms, although
contractual obligations regarding matters such as financing and
training may result in cooperation between unintegrated firms that
is similar to vertical integration.76
It has been argued that a vertical restraint arising from the
unilateral action of one integrated firm is likely to cause more harm
to the public than bilateral exclusive dealing agreements, which are
open to periodic renegotiation. The contention is that the
competition between dealers for suppliers and between
manufacturers for dealers ensures that the public interest is being
served. While in our view it cannot be assumed that competition
for exclusionary rights will always lead to efficient arrangements,
such bilateral agreements resulting from mutual accommodation are
76 It should also be noted that subsection 77(4) exempts exclusive dealing and tied selling
among affiliated firms.
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likely to be more benign than tying arrangements, which in many
cases are all-or-nothing offers imposed by suppliers with market
power.7
7
1. Facilitate collusion
Exclusive dealing may be used to facilitate collusion among
dealers of different suppliers. Widespread practice of exclusive
dealing among suppliers may limit the number of dealers, which
makes collusion easier because of the fewer numbers. Such practice
will also make it difficult for the members of a dealer cartel to hide
price cutting, and thus will strengthen the cartel. By foreclosing the
market to entering suppliers, widespread exclusive dealing may also
protect dealers from the threat of outside competition sparked by
supra-competitive prices.78
Exclusive dealing may also facilitate intra-brand cartels.
There is disagreement whether the effect of a cartel among dealers
of the same brand is to lessen competition. The us Vertical
Restraints Guidelines state that intra-brand cartels will not be treated
as horizontal agreements because "[s]uch restraints can have no
effect that could not also be obtained through the unilateral action
of the manufacturer of the particular brands in question."79
Exclusive dealing may also be used to facilitate collusion
among suppliers. Exclusive dealing facilitates the enforcement of a
cartel agreement by making it more difficult for suppliers to cheat.
Any change in a dealer's price can be traced to a specific supplier.
A supplier cartel is not likely to occur unless the suppliers' market
is concentrated. If the market is not concentrated, a supplier cartel
is unlikely to be able to coordinate prices without an express
agreement. Exclusive dealing could facilitate an agreement by
77 M.E. Porter, Interbrand Choice Strategy, and Bilateral Market (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1976).
78 The US Vertical Restraints Guidelines, supra, note 50 will classify such agreements as
horizontal agreements and thus illegal per se. This includes agreements to refuse to deal
with a seller at the same level of distribution.
79 Supra, note 51 at 7. See also W. Liebeler, "Intrabrand 'Cartels' Under GTE Sylvania"
(1982) 30 UCLA L Rev. 1.
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suppliers to divide the market geographically if dealers were
assigned non-overlapping territories.80
In the inquiry into Restraints on Competition in the Canadian
Petroleum Industry, the Director of Investigation and Research
argued before the RTPC that exclusive dealing restrictions on dealers
facilitated price rises at the wholesale level by "dominating motor
fuel marketing at retail." This is because "[a] small number of
refiners can more easily raise prices if they control the setting of
prices at a sufficient number of retail outlets than if they were to
sell only at wholesale to numerous independently owned-and-
operated distributors." '81  The Commission found no evidence of
collusion in any sector of the industry,8 2 but it highlighted as a
concern, minimum quantity requirements contracts which required
independents to purchase a minimum amount from a specific
retailer. Although the Commission found that the contracts were
not enforced, it was concerned that enforcement in the future would
lessen competition among refiners.83
2. Foreclosure of rivals
Foreclosure of existing and potential rivals in the supplier
or dealer market is another anti-competitive motivation for exclusive
dealing. The difficulty encountered here is that the existence of
foreclosure does not necessarily allow us to conclude that welfare is
reduced. Foreclosure can be the result of inefficient firms losing
ground to efficient ones. It is also conceivable that given the
existing concentration of market power in the economy, vertical
restraints leading to foreclosure may be welfare enhancing.
80 Schwartz & Eisenstadt, 'Vertical Restraint" (U.S. Department of Justice: Economic
Policy Office Paper No. 82-8, Dec. 2, 1982) at 92.
81 Reply Remedies Argument of the Director of Investigation and Research submitted
to the RTPC (22 August 1984) at M4.
82 RTPC, Competition in the Canadian Petroleum Industry (Hull, Que.: Supply & Services
Canada, 1986) at 461.
83 ]bid. at 285.
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One theory developed to determine when foreclosure is
detrimental is the leverage theory which assumes that leverage of
market power from one market to another is highly probable. This
theory underlies the adoption in the United States of a per se rule
of illegality for tied selling.84 The theory has been criticized by
economists on the basis that there are conditions under which
monopoly power cannot be extended into a second market.85  This
conclusion, however, should not divert attention from the possibility
of using exclusionary rights to create market power among firms
operating in an oligopolistic or even competitive market. The
purchase of an exclusionary right such as exclusive dealing can
confer power over output and price on suppliers "who absent these
rights would be selling inputs as competitors or oligopolists, not as
monopolists."8 6  Exclusionary rights can restrict supply to rivals or
84 Standard Oil Co of Calif. v. US., 337 U.S. 293 (1949) at 305-06. The United States
Supreme Court in 1949 concluded that "tying agreements serve hardly any purpose beyond the
suppression of competition." Tying arrangements were prohibited if the tying producer had
dominant market power and the arrangement accounted for a substantial quantity of
commerce in the tied good. Market dominance could be shown by evidence that (1) the
supplier makes a large number of tied sales and there is no buyer advantage in purchasing the
tied package, or (2) the supplier's tying product is unique because of its physical
characteristics, a legally conferred monopoly or an economic advantage possessed by the seller.
See also Betaseed, Inc. v. U, & I, Inc. 681 F.2d 1203 (9th Cir. 1982).
85 It is generally accepted that under certain conditions "there is only one monopoly
profit to be made in a chain of production." The following conditions are necessary for the
statement that there is only one monopoly profit to be made in two vertically adjacent
markets: (1) all inputs must be used in fixed proportions, (2) the restraining firm and its
rivals must face equal costs and have constant marginal costs of production, and (3) the
restraining firm and its rivals must be vertically integrated to the same degree. W.S. Bowman,
'Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem" (1957) 67 Yale LJ. 19. R.A. Posner,
Antitrust Law (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976). This conclusion was adopted by
O'Connor J. in the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Jefferson Parish Hospital
v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 104 S.Ct. 1551 (1984) at 27-28:
The existence of a tied product normally does not increase the profit that the
seller with market power can extract from sales of the tying product. A seller
with a monopoly on flour, for example, cannot increase the profit it can extract
from flour consumers simply by forcing them to buy sugar along with their
flour. Counterintuitive though that assertion may seem, it is easily
demonstrated and widely accepted.
If the products are sold in variable proportions, the tying producer may be able to increase
its monopoly profits through price discrimination.
86 T.G. Krattenmaker & S.C. Salop, "Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Costs
to Achieve Power over Price" (1986) 96 Yale LJ. 209 at 248.
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facilitate coordination among competing suppliers. In addition,
restraints by monopolist suppliers should not be ignored. There are
conditions under which a monopolist would agree to limit supply to
rivals of a purchaser.87
In our view, the approach of the critics of the leverage
theory who focus on the question of whether monopoly power has
been extended into a second market is too narrow in that it fails to
investigate the effect on welfare. This failure obscures the fact that
welfare effects of an extension of a monopoly are ambiguous.
Retaining the leverage theory does not necessarily imply that
efficient explanations for the conduct must be ignored; nor does
rejecting the leverage theory necessarily imply that the conduct
should be presumed to be efficient. Under either view, the
emphasis should be on setting out the conditions under which these
arrangements have a detrimental effect on welfare.8 8 The leverage
theory has not proven to be very useful since its emphasis is on the
creation of another monopoly, rather than on the welfare effects of
vertical restraints.
The consumer welfare model studies vertical restraints with
the view that they are detrimental only when they result in greater
market power in a market that is concentrated. The strategic
behaviour model examines the assumptions underlying the bilateral
monopoly model,89 and points out that in the real world conduct
directed at excluding rivals may be effective. These two current
models are compared and contrasted in the next section. The
general conclusion is that each theory is valid under different sets of
assumptions. The practical challenge is to determine which theory
is most generally applicable to a world where verifying the validity
of a set of assumptions may not be feasible.
87 Ibid. at 249, footnote 125.
88 Compare L. Kaplow, "Extension of Monopoly Power Through Leverage" (1985) 85
Colum. L Rev. 515, who argues that the alternative explanations for vertical restraints are not
convincing and would at the very least require that the firm be consciously pursuing an
efficient objective on the reasoning that many of the alternative explanations require conscious
pursuit if the result is to be efficient.
89 See supra, note 85 for the conditions under which it is impossible to extend monopoly
power from one market to another.
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V. SUBSTANTIAL LESSENING OF COMPETITION:
CONSUMER WELFARE MODEL v. STRATEGIC BEHAVIOUR
MODEL
A. Introduction
The foregoing discussion of models of economic behaviour
demonstrates the conflict between the goals of deconcentration and
economic efficiency; that is, deconcentrated markets may not be the
most efficient markets. The models also illustrate the importance
of the underlying assumptions about the effects of vertical restraints.
The consumer welfare model assumes the effects are almost always
efficient, while the other models are skeptical and assume that little
harm will be done by prohibiting restraints which have not been
shown in the particular case to be efficient or at least to have a
pro-competitive purpose.
Two approaches to the assessment of the anti-competitive
effects of exclusive dealing will be analyzed: the consumer welfare
school and the strategic behaviour school. The deconcentration
theory is not discussed because there is no established formal model
behind the theory that lends itself to analysis.
The following discussion first examines the anti-competitive
effects predicted by the consumer welfare model and sets out the
sufficient conditions for harm. The strategic behaviour model,
however, indicates that these conditions may not be necessary or,
at least, are not sufficiently developed. The consumer welfare
model does not develop fully the conditions under which rivals are
disadvantaged by vertical restraints and adopts a narrow definition
of entry barriers0 The next section describes a type of strategic
behaviour model - that of raising rivals' costs - which analyzes the
conditions that show harm to the firms remaining in the post-
90 Many advocates of the consumer welfare model adopt a narrow definition of entry
barriers. For example, it is argued that costs of capital to enter a market are not entry
barriers because the possession of capital by the established firm is "like its advantage in
having a functioning management team, knowledge, commercial contacts, and so on." Bork,
supra, note 44 at 324. Compare Williamson, supra, note 22 at 963 who argues that the capital
costs of entering one stage will be less than those of firms entering two stages because, among
other things, the firms entering at two levels will be penalized for lack of experience.
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restraint market and that confer market power on the excluding
firm. We do not repeat our discussion of the collusive aspects of
vertical restraints (see IV.B.1.) since all models are in agreement
that these exist and are detrimental.
B. Consumer Welfare Model
The principal anti-competitive effect predicted by the
consumer welfare model is the use of vertical restraints to reinforce
or extend market power. A firm may impose the restraint in the
market in which it has the largest share, by creating entry barriers
in that market. Exclusive dealing will foreclose competition in the
supplier market if the exclusive arrangement limits the supply of
dealers to such an extent that rival suppliers are forced to enter the
dealer market, and entry into the dealer market is difficult. With
difficult entry into the dealer market rival suppliers are eventually
forced to exit or, at least, to participate at a reduced level. This
enhances the original supplier's dominant position in the supplier
market.
The consumer welfare model, unlike the strategic behaviour
model, is not concerned if the restraint results in the creation of
another dominant firm in the dealer market - unless the effect is to
reinforce market power in the supplier market through the creation
of entry barriers into that market. The first order effects of firms
being forced to leave the dealer market are of concern to the
consumer welfare model only if entrants into the supplier market
are consequently forced to enter both the supplier and dealer
markets. In the view of the consumer welfare school, even if there
are few independent dealers, exclusive dealing will not increase the
costs of rival suppliers if entry into the dealer market is easy:91
rivals will be able to depend on new entrants or create new dealers
in response to the new demand generated by the rival to increase
the supply. Although competition has been lessened in the dealer
market in the sense that dealers have been foreclosed, it also must
be shown that there are barriers to entry in that market. "Even if
91 See Schwartz & Eisenstadt, supra, note 80 at 78.
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independents are largely eliminated, little is gained if the cost of
establishing new facilities is not significantly higher than the cost of
using existing ones, that is, if entry into the [dealer] market is
easy. 92
Under the consumer welfare model, in order for exclusive
dealing to have the effect of creating entry barriers such that rivals
in the supplier market are excluded, the following conditions must
be present:
1. The exclusive supplier must have a high market share in
the supply market, or exclusive dealing must be
widespread. There must be insufficient independent
dealers remaining; otherwise, a rival in the supplier market
will have adequate supplies of the product.
2. Entry barriers to the dealer market must be high, or entry
must require more than a specified period of time. This
inquiry focuses on the difficulties of a rival supplier in
entering the dealer market.
C. Raising Rivals Costs Model
1. Description
The analysis of the consumer welfare model can be criticized
on the basis that it ignores the competitive conditions in the dealer
market and focuses on the effect on rivals in the supplier market.
The consumer welfare model assumes that complete elimination of
independent rival suppliers should be permitted if entry barriers are
low or entry is possible in a "relatively short time."93 It is assumed
that potential entrants will exert sufficient pressure on prices to
prevent the remaining firms from raising prices. In contrast, the
strategic behaviour model would shift the focus away from potential
rival suppliers to an examination of the competitive conditions in
92
Ibid. at 80.
93 Vertical Restraints Guidelines, supra, note 51 at para. 4.21.
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the markets and propose that under certain conditions a pool of
firms should be maintained.
Recent work by economists Steven Salop and David
Scheffman and by law professor Thomas Krattenmaker has analyzed
exclusionary behaviour of dominant firms designed to raise rivals'
costs.94 The raising-rivals'-costs (RRC) model focuses on the impact
of the exclusionary conduct on the costs of rivals in the market.
Practices such as exclusive dealing, tied selling, and refusals to
supply may be used to restrict the supply of a product to rivals, thus
raising their costs and lowering their output. When this occurs
under certain conditions, the firm imposing the restraint may be able
to raise prices above the pre-restraint level.
Rivals' costs are raised when a purchaser of a restraint
restricts inputs to its rivals by making an agreement with suppliers
in the input market not to supply rivals. Either the upstream or
downstream market may be the input market. For example, in an
exclusive dealing arrangement, dealerships can be viewed as either
an input or an output. Dealerships are an input from the viewpoint
of the manufacturer whose objective is to distribute its product.
From the viewpoint of the dealer, the input market is that of the
manufactured product. The conduct that is regulated is restriction
by a purchaser of the supply of inputs to its rivals. Thus a
manufacturer may enter into exclusive dealing arrangements with
90% of the dealers and severely limit the supply of dealerships to
some or all of its rival manufacturers. Or a dealer may enter into
an exclusive dealing arrangement with a manufacturer and cut off
supply of that manufacturer's product to rival dealers; this conduct
does not come within the definition of exclusive dealing in the
Competition Act.95
The RRC model postulates four ways in which exclusive
arrangements that restrict inputs can raise costs for rivals of the
exclusive purchaser. As background, it is important to note that an
94 The following discussion summarizes the argument of Krattenmaker & Salop, supra,
note 86. See also Salop & Scheffman, "Cost-Raising Strategies" (Federal Trade Commission,
Working Paper No. 146, July, 1986).
95 Definition of exclusive dealing does not include exclusive dealing imposed by buyers
on suppliers. It is limited to restrictions imposed by suppliers on buyers. There is no
economic justification for the distinction.
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exclusive supply contract in and of itself does not restrict supply; it
simply reorganizes the chains of supply. Thus an agreement by
dealer A to carry the entire product of supplier X exclusively does
not necessarily raise the costs of A's rivals, because the exclusive
arrangement will free up supply from the rivals of X which had
been purchased by A. Rivals of A cut off from supplier X are able
to fulfill their needs from X's rivals.
The costs of A's rivals will rise, however, if A captures a
unique input with the result that rivals are forced to shift to higher
cost substitutes. The RRC model refers to this as a "bottleneck."
In this case the purchaser has captured the input market's lowest
cost suppliers where "those suppliers determine the input's market
price."96  This case is referred to in antitrust literature as the
"essential facilities doctrine" or the bottleneck.97 It is illustrated by
the facts in Terminal Railroad Association,98 in which a group of
railroad operators gained control of the only railway bridges across
the Mississippi River, and also obtained a promise that the bridge
would only be made available to other railroads on discriminatory
terms. The Restrictive Trade Practices Commission in the
Petroleum Inquiry concluded that in the Canadian petroleum
industry, refineries and large terminals are essential facilities. The
Commission adopted measures to assure continuing supply to
efficient independents and potential entrants. 99
Second, costs to A's rivals will also rise if there is insufficient
non-foreclosed supply to satisfy the needs of rivals at the
competitive price. Demand for the limited supply will drive the
price of the input up. A may limit supply of the input by
overbuying or by obtaining an agreement from suppliers not to
supply rivals, referred to in antitrust law as a "supply squeeze." The
RRC model classifies this as "real foreclosure" because A gains
96 Krattenmaker & Salop, supra, note 86 at 234. In the absence of the exclusive dealing
agreement, the lowest cost suppliers would have sufficient capacity to keep the price at the
competitive level.
97 See D.E. Troy, "Unclogging the Bottleneck: A New Essential Facility Doctrine"
(1983) 83 Colum. L Rev. 441.
98 224 U.S. 383 (1912).
99 Restrictive Trade Practices Commission, supra, note 82 at 453.
1989]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
control of the input with the ability to restrict supply and raise the
price. It should be noted that a bottleneck is a special case of real
foreclosure. The concept of foreclosure is illustrated by R. v. British
Columbia Fruit Growers Association,100 in which an association of
fruit growers gained exclusive rights to the services of all the full
storage and packing facilities in British Columbia.
Third, costs to A's rivals may rise because A is using the
exclusive arrangement to orchestrate a cartel agreement among
input suppliers such as retail dealers.101 For instance, in Interstate
Circuit,1 0 2 the operators of motion picture theaters obtained a
promise from a group of distributors that they would in effect raise
the cost of exhibiting films to rivals by requiring second run theaters
to raise their ticket prices. The RRC model refers to this strategy
as "cartel ringmaster."
Fourth, costs to A's rivals may rise because the remaining
unrestrained input suppliers are able to fix prices. For example, if
only one unrestrained retailer remains, that retailer has market
power over A's rivals (assuming there are entry barriers). The RRC
model refers to this strategy as "Frankenstein monster."
These strategies may be illustrated by the facts of
Bombardier.103 Bombardier, a producer of snowmobiles, entered
into exclusive dealing arrangements with its Canadian dealers. The
RTPC held that the exclusive dealing did not violate section 77.
Applying the RRC model's analysis, the practice would have raised
100 (1985) 11 C.P.R. (3d) 183 (B.C.C.A.). It should be noted that this conduct should
be classified as horizontal, not vertical, because of the horizontal agreement among members
of the association. The Association was charged under former s. 32(1)(a) (now 45(1)(a)) for
conspiring to limit storage facilities. The verdict of not guilty was based on the court's
findings that although independent fruit producers were foreclosed from full service packing
houses, entry into the packing house market was easy, and that independent producers
continued to market fruit despite the foreclosure.
101 It should be noted that cartel agreements can be attacked directly under section 45
as a conspiracy which substantially lessens competition. Exclusionary acts by monopolies that
limit supply are regulated by sections 78 and 79 of the Competition Act supra, note 1. For
example, the following anti-competitive acts are listed: s. 78(e) pre-emption of scarce
resources; s. 78(t) overbuying; s. 78(h) requiring or inducing a supplier to sell only to certain
customers.
102 306 U.S. 207 (1959).
103 Supra, note 12.
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Bombardier's rivals' costs of distribution if (1) non-foreclosed dealers
did not have sufficient capacity to meet rivals' needs, (2) non-
foreclosed dealers of snowmobiles were less efficient than the
foreclosed dealers, (3) Bombardier induced dealers not to deal with
rivals or to charge high prices, or (4) the non-foreclosed dealers
were so concentrated that they were able to charge supra-
competitive prices to rivals. Requirement (1) does not affect rivals'
costs if entry into the dealer market is easy, as the Commission
found to be the case. Requirement (2) was argued in Bombardier
but not discussed by the Commission. Any advantage to
Bombardier from possessing the "best" dealers was implicitly rejected
as an important factor by the Commission's finding of high
turnover of Bombardier dealers and vigorous recruitment of
Bombardier dealers by rivals. There was no evidence of
requirement (3). Regarding requirement (4), the Commission found
that entry into the dealer market was easy and therefore dealers
possessed no special market power.
2. Criticism
There has been some opposition to the RRC model. One
criticism is that the model is redundant because existing
monopolization and conspiracy provisions would prohibit conduct
identified as anti-competitive by the RRC model. The argument is
that in order to raise rivals' costs, control over the input market is
necessary. This market power should be caught as monopolization
of the input market without worrying about the second-order
considerations of what a firm with such control in the input market
can do in the forward market. While this argument is theoretically
appealing, there are a number of reasons why competition policy
may fail to catch concentrations of power in the input market. For
example, although the act of monopolization is illegal,104 simply
having a large market share is not. Thus, a firm that acquired
market power in the past through means not prohibited by the
Competition Act or not detected by enforcement authorities could
104 Supra, note 1, s. 50.
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later choose to exercise that power without violating the
monopolization section, if it does not intend to exclude rivals or
impede entry. The effect of the RRC model is to discourage the
formation of monopolies.
In addition, for the purposes of the monopolization section,
the RRc model's definition of the input market may be narrower
than the market definition.105 For example, Alcoa, a supplier of
aluminium, monopolized the supply of electricity to rival aluminium
suppliers; it did not monopolize the market for electricity. 6 A
court considering an allegation of monopolization may not recognize
this narrowly defined input market, while the RRC analysis highlights
the anti-competitive effect of Alcoa's conduct by explicating the
possible anti-competitive motives and effects.
Some other criticisms of the RRC model are at a more
practical level. Since the model results in more complex legal rules,
it is feared that firms will be uncertain about what conduct is legal.
This uncertainty may lead them to avoid legally marginal but
efficient conduct./'07 Moreover, the complexity may result in courts
not being able to recognize the conditions set out by the RRC
model tests. This uncertainty about how courts will interpret the
conditions will lead to further conservative behaviour on the part of
firms, resulting in greater inefficiency. We reject these concerns
because we feel that while there are many conditions under the
RRC model tests that give the illusion of complexity, each condition
is straightforward and can be verified as easily as the conditions of
any other of the competing tests. Thus, we think that neither the
firms nor the courts will be any more baffled by this set of
conditions than they are by other possible sets of conditions.
Finally, the model has been rejected by the advocates of the
consumer welfare model for fear that a recognition of strategic
behaviour will lead to a revival of the antitrust doctrines of vertical
105 Brennan, "Understanding 'Raising Rivals' Costs' United States Department of Justice
Economic Analysis Group, EAG 86-16, September 26, 1986.
1 0 6 bid. at 28.
107 Brennan, supra, note 105.
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foreclosure and predation, 108 doctrines that are in their view
obsolete. We conclude that this fear is exaggerated and, in any
event, is irrelevant in the face of legislation that prohibits predatory
conduct.
D. Comparison of the Two Models and the Conditions Indicating an
Anti-competitive Impact
Although both the RRC model and the consumer welfare
model derive from economic reasoning, their policy prescriptions are
very dissimilar. The differences stem from the objectives adopted in
each model and the assumptions being made. The RRC model
differs from the consumer welfare model in that under the RRC
model an anti-competitive impact is possible even if supply in the
input market is sufficient or the restraint does not create entry
barriers in the output market. In addition, the RRC model examines
the possibility of collusion by the unrestrained suppliers or by all
suppliers of the input, and whether overbuying has been used to
increase rivals' costs.
1. Assumptions
The two models differ on two crucial assumptions: (1) the
likelihood that firms will be able to purchase exclusionary rights that
do not reflect their full value to the purchaser, and (2) the
likelihood of entry barriers.
The consumer welfare model argues that a rational seller of
an exclusionary right would not agree to confer a benefit on the
purchaser of the right without receiving full compensation. Thus,
it is doubtful that sellers of a unique input such as a raw material
would sell it exclusively to one purchaser for a price less than that
of substitutes so that the purchaser's costs would be lower than
those of its rivals.
We reject this argument because it assumes that the bidding
process for exclusionary rights is perfect, while in the real world
108 Baxter, supra, note 63.
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bidding is subject to the imperfections of asymmetric information
and uncertainty. Even if bidding were perfect, it cannot be assumed
that a competitive market for exclusionary restraints "will lead to
competitive product markets."10 9 In addition, the problem of a
bidding process depriving the excluding firms of any benefit does
not arise in the case of tied selling by an integrated firm.
The consumer welfare model defines entry barriers as long-
run costs incurred by an entrant that are not incurred by firms
already in the industry.110 But the strategic behaviour model defines
them as whatever makes entry more difficult and permits an
established firm to charge supra-competitive prices without attracting
new entry. We agree that entry barriers should include the case in
which a firm entering the market has higher costs than existing
firms.
2. Comparison of the consumer welfare model and the RRC model
a) Limitation of supply versus raising cost of an input
The consumer welfare model is primarily concerned with the
degree of foreclosure to rivals of the firm imposing the restraint. In
the absence of entry barriers, it would permit tied selling even if all
producers of the tied product were eliminated as a result. The
consumer welfare model is only concerned with increases in
concentration that confer market power in the classical sense: a
few firms remain in a market where they are free from competitive
pressure on price and there are no potential entrants. For example,
it focuses on the degree of foreclosure in the supplier market of
109 Krattenmaker & Salop, supra, note 86 at 277. See P. Mathewson and Winter, 'he
Competitive Effects of Vertical Agreements: Comment" (1987) Amer. Econ. Rev. 1057 at
1062. They adopt a middle ground between the per se legality approach of Bork and
proposals that exclusive dealing should be prohibited when rivals are excluded and there are
no concerns about free-riders. "Our model thus speaks against a per se approach to exclusive
dealing. The rule suggested by Thomas Krattenmaker and Steven Salop, that an exclusionary
practice should be prohibited when it allows a firm to raise its price is supported as a
conservative rule of reason or expost test of legality."
110 GJ. Stigler, The Organization of Industry (Homewood, Ill.: R.D. Irwin, 1968).
[VOL. 27 NO. 4
Market Behaviour and Competition Law
rivals seeking to expand or enter, who must enter two levels at the
same time because inadequate supplies are available.
The strategic behaviour model, in contrast, argues that the
purchaser of exclusionary rights can gain some control over price
by raising rivals' costs even in a perfectly competitive market, if the
increase in rivals' marginal costs results in a higher competitive
market price. All that is necessary is the restraint of output by
rivals and the existence of entry barriers.111  It assumes that costs
are raised not only by being deprived of an input and therefore
being forced to enter at two levels, but also by conduct which raises
the cost of an input above the cost to rivals. The RRC model, for
example, would prohibit a restraint which raised concentration in the
input market to such a level that collusion is likely. In this case
rivals of the excluding firm will not be able to obtain the input at a
competitive price and the restraining firm will be able to raise
prices. In contrast, the consumer welfare model is satisfied if there
is sufficient capacity in the input market remaining to supply an
entering rival. The RRC model will condemn a restraint if the
restraint has caused the price to rise significantly, even if there is
sufficient capacity remaining to supply rivals. (Entry barriers are
implicitly assumed since in their absence, pressure from potential
entrants would keep the price down).
b) Creation of entry barriers
The RRC model does not require that the restraint create an
entry barrier which forces entry at both levels.112 It is objectionable
if the restraint raises the costs of rivals and the restraining firm is
able to raise prices because entry barriers which existed before the
imposition of the restraint forced the rivals to depend on established
firms for their supplies of the restricted input. A model which
examines the position of existing firms is consistent with the wording
III See Krattenmaker & Salop, supra, note 86 at 251, footnotes 131-32 and at 265,
footnote 179. They give the example of a market for taxi rides. If bus service is greatly
reduced and no new taxis enter the market, taxi owners collectively will likely earn more
although no single taxi driver has power over price.
112 Krattenmaker & Salop, ibid at 285.
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of section 77 which refers to impediments to expansion as well as
entry. The output of a firm whose costs have increased and which
is forced to raise its price will in most cases fall.
c) Market concentration
Third, the RRC model permits the inference of power over
price and output from measures of market concentration. This
approach examines the ability of the nonexclusive firms (that is,
firms which are not a party to the exclusive agreement) to constrain
price increases by the exclusive firm after the restriction is in place.
The basic question is whether the restraint raises the costs of the
nonexclusive firms and if so, whether this cost increase confers
power on the restraining firm to raise prices.
d) Overbuying
Lastly, the RRC model demonstrates that overbuying of inputs
or highly complementary products through exclusive dealing or other
vertical restraints can be a profitable strategy in combatting rivals.
This has been shown even in the case of a tying of two products in
fixed proportions which is the classical case in which critics of the
leverage theory argue that a monopolist cannot increase monopoly
profits.113
VI. RECOMMENDED ANALYSIS: SUBSTANTIAL LESSENING
OF COMPETITION
A Introduction
The above analysis points out the different underlying
assumptions of the two models. We agree with the RRC model that
the possibilty of firms being able to purchase exclusionary rights is
113 K.K. Wollenberg, "An Economic Analysis of Tie-In Sales: Re-examining the Leverage
Theory" (1987) 39 Stan. L. Rev. 737.
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a real one, and we adopt the assumption that the limitation of
supply through the acquisition of exclusionary rights is likely. We
also adopt the RRC model's definition of entry barrier. In this
section, in the light of these assumptions, we take exclusive dealing
as an example and discuss the conditions necessary for these
arrangements to have an anti-competitive effect.
Section 77 prohibits exclusive dealing when undertaken by a
major supplier, or when exclusive dealing is widespread in the
market and is likely to impede entry or expansion with the result
that competition is or is likely to be substantially lessened. The two
conditions, (1) impediment to entry or expansion and (2) a
substantial lessening of competition, can be defined using the
foregoing discussion of the anti-competitive effects of exclusionary
conduct, which draws primarily on those conditions suggested by the
RRC model.
The conditions in subsection 77(2) of impediments to entry
or expansion and a substantial lessening of competition were
encapsulated into one inquiry by the Restrictive Trade Practices
Commission in Bombardier. The Commission stated, "[W]hether
exclusive dealing by a supplier impedes expansion or entry of
competitors in the market is most easily and meaningfully considered
as part of the determination of whether there is or is likely to be a
substantial lessening of competition as a result of the practice. 114
The legislative debates indicate that merely impeding entry is not
sufficient, but that the question is "whether entry is impeded to such
an extent that competition is likely to be lessened substantially. 115
The section mandates a rule-of-reason analysis which assesses the
impact on competition in each case.
This rule of reason analysis can be compared to a per se rule
which is a conclusive presumption. Under a per se rule, conduct is
presumed to have an anti-competitive effect once it is shown to
come within certain classes which the courts have determined are
highly likely to have a pernicious effect on competition. The
114 Supra, note 12 at 37.
115 House of Commons Standing Committee on Finance, Trade, and Economic Affairs,
May 29, 1975 at 52:15.
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defendant cannot escape liability by showing that the conduct in
reality has a pro-competitive or neutral effect on competition.
Under a rule of reason, the effect of conduct on competition
is assessed in each case. It is a misconception, however, to assume
that this inquiry must be begun anew each time. Any such wide-
ranging inquiry involves implicit evidentiary burdens based on the
logical effect of the evidence. Courts have traditionally been
prepared to develop evidentiary presumptions from recurring factual
situations based on generalizations about behaviour. For example,
based on the generalization that a person in possession of stolen
goods is probably the real offender, evidence that an accused was
found in possession of recently stolen goods is sufficient to identify
the accused as the thief, in the absence of an explanation from the
accused. This is not a matter of substantive law, in contrast to the
per se rule which in effect redefines the elements of the illegal
conduct but is a matter of common sense and experience. The
inference that the person in possession is the perpetrator of the
theft flows from the logical effect of the facts based on our
assumptions about behaviour. Logical inferences from the evidence
place an evidentiary burden on defendants to explain their conduct.
B. Rule of Reason: An Unreasonableness Test
Models of market behaviour provide the basis for
generalizations about vertical restraints and the structure for a rule-
of-reason analysis. The level of evidence sufficient to show a
substantial lessening of competition is a matter of logical inferences
based on generalizations from the economic models discussed. Once
the existence of an exclusive dealing arrangement has been
established, one possible test is to infer a substantial lessening of
competition if (1) the defendant has a large market share and (2)
entry barriers exist in the market in which supply has allegedly been
cut off or limited, 6 unless (3) the defendant has a reasonable pro-
116 The reasoning here is as follows: If a firm or a set of firms with a dominant position
are using exclusive dealing to the detriment of their rivals by limiting supply, then such an
action can have an effect on the rivals only if there are barriers to entry in the dealer market.
Otherwise, such an action will cause no harm, since the dealer market will attrack more
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competitive explanation for the practice. This inference is based on
the assumptions that exclusive dealing is likely to limit supply, a pro-
competitive effect is unlikely unless this was the defendant's
objective, and the class of conduct which is difficult or impossible to
identify as anti- or pro-competitive should be assumed to be anti-
competitive unless the defendant reasonably intended it to have a
pro-competitive effect. (If there is no pro-competitive intention and
there is no information about the conduct, the test assumes it is
equally likely to have a good or bad effect, and the burden is placed
on the defendant to show a good effect.) This approach is
consistent with the history and goals of the legislation which gives
weight to consumer choice and an "equitable" opportunity to
compete.117  This test will be referred to as the unreasonableness
test because the default assumption is that when the first two
conditions are met, the restraint is unreasonable unless the
defendant provides an explanation.
1. Market share
A necessary but not sufficient condition for a vertical
restraint to cause an anti-competitive effect is foreclosure of supply.
Foreclosure of supply in combination with entry barriers indicates
that expansion or entry has been impeded as required by section 77
of the Competition Act. Foreclosure of supply through exclusive
dealing arrangements may be inferred from market share and entry
barriers. Exclusive dealing by a monopolist cuts off supply of the
monopolist's product from unrestrained dealers. If a monopolist
engages in exclusive dealing, entry barriers exist in the supplier
market, and a pro-competitive explanation is absent, then the
exclusive dealing will be prohibited under the unresonableness test.
Exclusive dealing which impedes expansion of independent firms in
dealers (who can clearly enter in the absence of entry barriers), who would then serve the
rivals. Similarly, when there is a dominant dealer, there must be barriers to entry in the
supplier market, so that exclusive dealing between the suppliers and the dominant dealer will
hurt other dealers. Thus, the entry barriers must be in the market'in which the supply has
been cut off or limited.
117 Supra, note 1, s. 1.1.
1989]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
the dealer market because of inaccessibility to the product of the
monopolist will be sufficient.
The unreasonableness test may be compared to the standards
adopted in other sections of the Competition Act to control
foreclosure of supply. A monopolist supplier can avoid application
of subsection 77(2) because a monopolist, A, does not need to
impose exclusive dealing in order to achieve the effect of exclusive
dealing with B. It merely needs to choose to supply B exclusively.
No commitment by B to deal only with A is necessary since by
definition A is the only firm in the A market. When there is no
exclusive dealing arrangement, the conduct can be assessed under
the rules on a refusal to deal under section 75 and abuse of
dominant position by a monopolist under section 77.118
Section 75 requires that a person be substantially affected
in its business by the refusal, and that the inability to obtain
supplies be due to insufficient competition among suppliers. This
imposes a higher standard for prohibiting the conduct than our
proposed test for section 77. First, it requires the firm which was
refused supply to show substantial effect on its business and not
merely a foreclosure of supply. Second, the section also requires
that the inability to obtain supply be "because of insufficient
competition among suppliers of the product." It is an open question
whether refusals directed at the secondary level of distribution by a
monopolist will be presumed to be caused by insufficient
competition unless the supplier shows a legitimate business reason
for the refusal. The duty of a monopolist to supply is consistent
with the "especially strict standards of conduct ... required [of a
monopolist] ..... 119 Section 75, however, does not require proof of
entry barriers. In our view there is no inconsistency between an
unreasonableness standard under section 77 and refusal to supply
118 Section 78, ibid, regulates among other conduct (a) vertical price squeezes, (e) pre-
emption of scarce facilities or resources, (f) buying up of products to prevent the erosion of
existing price levels, (1h) requiring a supplier to sell only or primarily to certain customers, or
to refrain from selling to a competitor.
119 R v. Electric Reduction of Canada Ltd (1970), 61 C.P.R. 235 (Ont. H.C.). Thc
R.T.P.C. in its report on the petroleum industry, supra, note 82, vol. III at 67, recommended
that "suppliers who hold high degrees of market power should be entitled to refuse supply to
others except to the extent that they can establish sufficient reason for refusing supply."
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under section 75, because of their different objectives. Section 75
provides a remedy when individual firms are harmed and no barriers
to entry exist. Section 77 is designed to prevent substantial harm to
competition.
The section 78 provision on abuse of dominant position does
not catch all limitations of supply by a dominant firm. It is
primarily directed at the pre-emption of supply from other sources.
For example, the section would cover buying up products for the
purpose of preventing the erosion of existing price levels,120 or pre-
empting scarce facilities or resources for the purpose of limiting
supply.1 21 A refusal to supply a product produced by the dominant
firm, often referred to as a "supply squeeze," is not listed among
the anti-competitive acts in section 78. It would appear therefore
that a monopolist could choose to supply one dealer exclusively as
long as the arrangement was not contrary to section 75, covering
refusal to deal.
Unlike the RRC model, the unreasonableness test does not
require a detailed investigation into the effect of the practice on
supply or costs. It assumes that foreclosure of supply exists when
both exclusive dealing by a dominant firm in an oligopoly and entry
barriers to the relevant market are established. There is no inquiry
as to whether the reduction in supply can be remedied by
alternative sources, on the assumption that other sources are
unlikely given the entry barriers. The RRc model, in contrast,
assesses alternative sources of supply by measuring, among other
factors, the net foreclosure rate: that is, the percentage of the
supplier's capacity available to rivals before the restraint but that is
no longer available as a result of the agreement.
2. Are there entry barriers?
Rivals will not be affected by interruption in the supply of
inputs or by increased costs of inputs unless there are barriers to
entry. Without barriers, other firms can quickly enter the input
120 Supra, note 1 at s. 78(f).
121 Ibid at s. 78(e).
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market to satisfy the needs of rival firms. Evidence of barriers to
entry in the input market is needed to demonstrate harm to rivals.
A detailed discussion of entry barriers is outside our terms of
reference, but there is a straight-forward condition for the existence
of barriers to entry. The costs, fixed or marginal, of a firm entering
in the short run are greater than those for an efficient existing firm.
It is sufficient that costs be even slightly higher, because this implies
that rivals' costs will be increased in two ways. First, because of the
higher costs, fewer firms will enter the supply market than
otherwise, which means that there is still a supply shortfall. Second,
when higher costs are even partially passed on in price, the rivals
will be facing higher costs for their inputs. Moreover, it is sufficient
for the barriers to be short-run, since with such disadvantages, the
rivals cannot compete in the short run. The firm imposing the
restraint will then be able to expand market share during the rivals'
temporary set-back.
One approach is to require that the post-restraint input
market be fully contestable in the sense that market pressures will
push price down to costs, thus passing savings on to the consumers
of the product. This broad definition of entry barriers would
further the goal of deconcentration and would make it more likely
that savings be passed on to consumers. Under this approach it is
not sufficient for savings to be passed on to consumers in the
aggregate. In contrast, the consumer welfare model is unconcerned
about distributional effects and treats consumers as a group.122 It
assumes that they are better off as a group even if savings go to
producers and are not passed on to the specific consumers of the
restrained product, because producers will be able to invest in other
products which consumers want. Requiring that the market be fully
contestable is more consistent with the view of European Economic
Community competition law, which requires that benefits from
combinations that distort competition be passed on to consumers of
122 See Bork, supra, note 44.
[VOL. 27 No. 4
1989] Market Behaviour and Competition Law
the relevant product 23 This possibility has also been pointed out
in American antitrust commentary.1 24
One way to increase the degree of contestability is to adopt
a narrow definition of potential entrants. Firms that are now in the
market, but have the potential to enter if market prices rise, exert
a downward pressure on price. Potential entrants could be confined
to those firms which already produce the product but distribute in
another geographical market, or those firms able to produce the
product with few changes in their existing production process.1
25
We would include as a barrier, to entry proof that a firm
must enter at both levels in order to expand. The RTPC in BBM
appeared to hold that when this is shown, no further barriers to
entry need be proven! 26  In this case, competition is substantially
lessened when supply of an input is completely cut off from a rival,
and the cut-off firm's demand cannot be met by its own rivals. In
this case the restraint has not merely redistributed supply, it has
reduced supply.
123 See Fox, supra, note 56 at 1019; infra, note 137, and s. 85(3) of the Treaty of Rome
in relation to combinations to restrain competition.
124 See Fisher & Lande, supra, note 68 at 1631-34.
125 Posner, supra, note 85 at 124 concludes that "[o]n the basis of present knowledge it
would seem best simply to ignore potential competitors who cannot be regarded as equivalent
to the firms already in the market." Alternatively, Professor Sullivan has recommended that
a variety of market definitions be employed in each case, a process described as "peeling the
onion." Sullivan, supra, note 17 at 609-12. Sullivan describes the expert testimony of Dr. Alan
McAdams provided market data on groupings of related products and then successively
stripped products out of the group figures to show "the quantitative significance of multiple
product groupings and to infer the significance of these data for analyzing IBM's market
power." This would enable the Court to look at the problem from a variety of angles and
avoid the danger of adopting a simplistic rule that ignores the reality of the situation. Sullivan
suggests the question on monopolization might be stated as: "Whether, given all the evidence,
including alternative expert appraisal of the data, the market is one in which sufficient power
exists to make predation by the defendant a significant risk."
126 While the RTPC does emphasize the exclusionary effect of forcing Nielsen to enter
at two levels, the decision does not state clearly whether it is sufficient if a firm is forced to
enter at both levels or whether there must be entry barriers to the second market. The
RTPC does appear to have found that entry into either market was difficult. It stated that
"[p]roducing broadcast data involves high fixed costs," and it noted the lack of entry in the last
18 years and the absence of any current threat to enter.
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3. Is there a pro-competitive explanation?
Pro-competitive explanations would be taken into account in
deciding if there is a substantial lessening of competition. The
Tribunal would inquire whether there is evidence supporting a pro-
competitive explanation for the practice, such as encouraging
innovation or reducing transaction costs. While the absence of an
explanation is ambiguous because managers may not understand the
impact on competition, the existence of a pro-competitive
explanation helps to explain the conduct. 127 The absence of pro-
competitive purpose does make it less likely the restraint is pro-
competitive, since most of the projected efficient outcomes are more
probable if the firm has a conscious purpose to achieve them.128
Similarly, while the section does not require that the defendant
intend its actions to have an adverse effect on competition, evidence
of an anti-competitive purpose may indicate the actual effects of the
practice.
C. Rule of Reason: The Ric Model
The principal difference between an unreasonableness test
and the RRC model is that the unreasonableness test would prohibit
a restraint that foreclosed supply, without requiring proof of "actual
or probable competitive injury '129 in the form of higher rivals' costs.
Competitive injury is inferred from market share and entry barriers.
In contrast, the RRC model would not prohibit overbuying, for
example, unless it was shown that the overbuying was "significantly
in excess of what the defendant really needed or, perhaps that the
input purchasers were so large that significantly inefficient resource
use would occur."130 Under an unreasonableness test, an exclusive
dealing arrangement which reduced the retailing capacity to rivals
127 See U.S. Vertical Guidelines, supra, note 8 at para. 4.226.
128 See Kaplow, supra, note 88 at 543.
129 Krattenmaker & Salop, supra, note 86 at 282.
13 0 kid. at 282, note 228.
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would be prohibited if the conditions of dominant firm, entry
barriers, and absence of pro-competitive explanation were not met.
Application of the RRC model would require an inquiry into
whether rivals' costs were actually raised in the individual case.
Beginning with an assumption that the restraining firm is a major
supplier or that the practice of exclusive dealing is widespread, the
following measures indicate whether rivals' costs have increased:
- Has there been a reduction in the supply of dealers which
is not remedied by alternative sources of supply? *At the
same time has the share of the restraining firm increased?
Evidence of changes in market shares must be carefully
evaluated. In many cases it will be misleading. In Bombardier, the
RaTC held that there was no substantial lessening of competition
because entry was easy and the market shares of Bombardier's
competitors had increased. The market share data, however, was
ambiguous. Any increase may not have been due to the recruitment
of new dealers. Takach points out that the increase might have
been caused by increases in advertising or other means 31 An
increase in market share by the supplier does not necessarily imply
a decrease in consumer welfare; it may simply mean that the
supplier has captured market share from departing rivals. A
decrease in the market share of the supplier does not necessarily
mean that the supplier lacks market power. In fact, an increase in
price and a concomitant decrease in market share may in some
circumstances be evidence of market power.1 32
- What is the net foreclosure rate - that is, the percentage
of the suppliers' capacity available to rivals before the
restraint but that is no longer available as a result of the
agreement.1 33
131 Takach, "Case Comment on Bombardier" (1983-84), 8 Can. Bus. L. 3. 226.
132 See Berkey Photo Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert.
denied 444 U.S. 1093 (1980). See also U.S. v. Dairymen Inc., [1985] Trade Cases 66,638 (6th
Cir).
133 For example, if a manufacturer with 20% of the sales of a product enters into an
exclusive dealing arrangement with dealers which account for 30% of the retailing capacity,
the net foreclosure rate is 12.5%. Before the agreement, 80% of the retailing capacity was
available to rivals. The manufacturer has foreclosed 10% of that capacity. The net
foreclosure rate is 10% divided by 80% or 12.5%. If the manufacturer had 10% of the sales
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- What is the market share of the unrestrained dealers?
Does the restraint order confer market power on the
unrestrained dealers which enables them to raise prices to
rivals of the firm imposing the restraint?
Standards adopted to assess the impact of mergers can be
employed in the above analysis.1 34 For example, in assessing the
impact on the market power of unrestrained firms, the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI) for the dealer market before the restraint
could be compared to the HHI of a hypothetical market consisting
only of the unrestrained dealers using the standard for mergers.1 35
If the increase in concentration is more than that permitted for pre-
and post-merger markets and there are entry barriers, the restraint
should be prohibited. Should horizontal merger thresholds be
applied to exclusionary vertical restraints? In our view, the
differences between exclusionary restraints balance the similarities.
On the one hand, a restraint does not confer complete control and
is a more costly device than simply cutting output in a merged firm.
On the other hand, excluded rivals may have more incentive to
collude, causing more social waste than a simple output restriction
in vertical relationships 36
of the product, the net foreclosure rate would be 22%. See Krattenmaker & Salop, supra,
note 86 at 260.
134 A straight application of the Merger Guidelines 1982 would measure the power of the
purchaser to control price by assuming that the purchaser of an exclusionary right has merged
with all the excluded firms (those firms whose costs have been raised significantly). The
question is the same as that in the Merger Guidelines. does the absence of the excluded firms
as a constraint permit the purchasing firm, either unilaterally or collusively, to raise price?
This measure must be modified, however, because the restraint does not confer complete
control over rivals. Rivals may continue non-price competition, sharing of supra-competitive
profits is not as easy as in the case of a merged firm, and raising rivals' costs is a less efficient
method of cutting output than ordering a subsidiary to cut its output. See Krattenmaker &
Salop, ibid. at 263.
135 The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of market concentration is calculated by squaring
the market shares of each firm in the relevant market and summing the values. The HHI for
a market with one firm is 100 squared or 10,000. The HHI for a market with five firms with
20% market share each would be 202 + 202 + 202 + 202 + 202 = 2,000. The Merger
Guidelines 1982 recommend challenging mergers when the post-merger HHI is between 1000
and 1800 and the HHI increase due to the merger is more than 100, or where the post
merger HHI is over 1800, and the merger increases HHI by more than 50. See Weinslock,
"Using the Herfindahl Index to Measure Concentration" (1982) Antitrust Bull. 285.
136 See Krattenmaker & Salop, supra, note 86 at 266.
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An alternative approach is the same measure proposed in
the American Merger Guidelines 1984 on vertical mergers: are post-
merger sales (purchases) by unintegrated firms in the secondary
(supplier) market sufficient to service two minimum-efficient-scale
plants in the primary (purchaser) market?137  It is submitted that
measures of the increase in concentration are preferable. With
regard to exclusive dealing, the question should be whether
sufficient number of unrestrained dealers remain to exert a
downward pressure on price. Increases in concentration are an
accepted measure of this power, while in contrast, the two-efficient-
firms standard is unrelated to theory and appears arbitrary. 138
- Are the remaining nonexclusive firms able to produce an
efficient level of output?
If these firms are able to produce output for sale at the
competitive price, rivals' costs will not rise.
- Hat total output gone down?
It is argued that consumers cannot be hurt if industry output
rises and prices fall. The difficulty is that first, industry output is
difficult to measure if, for example, the market is growing or costs
change. Second, the test is often misapplied by asking whether the
output of the restraining firm rose rather than looking at the
industry as a whole.139 This is misleading since, as explained above,
it may merely mean that the restraining firm has gained 100 percent
of the market. In addition, under certain conditions when products
are differentiated, consumer welfare can fall when output rises.140
Third, a static model measures effects on output and price
assuming that a market is unaffected by external events, while in
the real world there are many explanations for changes in output.
A static model requires a comparison of the output after
exclusionary activity with the output in a hypothetical market that is
identical to the monopolized market in all respects except for the
13 7 Supra, note 15 at para. 4.211.
138 Krattenmaker & Salop, supra, note 86 at 285.
139 See ibid. at 283-84, who point out that Judge Easterbrook has made this error.
140 W.S. Comanor, "Vertical Price Fxing, Vertical Market Restrictions, and the New
Antitrust Policy" (1985) 98 Harv. L. Rev. 983.
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existence of the monopoly.141 These difficulties may be resolved by
means of a dynamic model using standard statistical techniques that
take into account any exogenous factors affecting output. Such a
model can predict expected output after the exclusionary activity.
However, this is not an easy task.
In contrast to these measures of impact on costs and supply
in the individual case, an unreasonableness test infers foreclosure of
supply and its consequent impeding expansion from the proof of an
exclusive dealing arrangement, market share and entry barriers.
Rival suppliers will be cut off from the dealers who agree to deal
exclusively with the firm imposing the restraint. Unrestrained
dealers will be cut off from the dominant supplier. When there are
entry barriers, the rivals will be impeded from setting up new
dealers to compensate for the reduction in supply of dealers, and
existing dealers cannot expect new firms to enter the supply market.
While it may be that the supply of the remaining dealers in the
market is sufficient to satisfy the needs of the rivals, or that the
remaining unrestrained suppliers will produce sufficient quantities
for the unrestrained dealers, the unreasonableness test assumes
these possibilities are too remote to be worth the cost of a detailed
investigation when the exclusive dealing is imposed by a dominant
firm. It is open to the defendant to show that the exclusive dealing
did not reduce the retailing capacity available to rival firms.
VII. CONCLUSION
Examination of the premises underlying various models of
market behaviour clarifies the choice of a legal standard. We have
set out four models of market behaviour based on the legal and
economic literature on anti-competitive conduct. Comparison of
these four models illuminates the underlying assumptions. The
structuralist model assumes that there is a causal connection
between concentration and collusion. Empirical studies have failed
to support the validity of this assumption and, in addition, the
Competition Act appears to reject a structuralist approach. Our
141 See Hovenkamp, supra, note 39 at 256 (discussion of the static market fallacy).
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discussion highlighted a disagreement over the definition of entry
barrier, the consumer welfare model adopting a narrower definition
than the strategic behaviour model. There are also different
assumptions about the probability that the interests of manufacturers
and consumers will coincide. The consumer welfare model assumes
that this is highly probable, while the strategic behaviour model
highlights the instances when there is a conflict of interest. In
relation to the vertical restraint of exclusive dealing, there is
disagreement over whether competition at the wholesale level will
result in monopolist dealers in local markets charging lower
prices.1 42 Also in relation to vertical restraints generally, there is
disagreement over whether firms will be able to purchase
exclusionary rights that do not reflect their full value to the
purchaser. The strategic behaviour model assumes these agreements
are probable in the real world with its asymmetric information and
uncertainty, while the consumer welfare model assumes such
agreements are unlikely.
In addition to empirical assumptions about the likelihood and
effect of market conduct, there are also assumptions about the
ability of adjudicators to understand and evaluate the information,
the interaction between various legal standards, and the
administrative costs of obtaining information. For example,
advocates of the consumer welfare model reject the RRC analysis
partly because they are skeptical of the ability of adjudicators to
apply the analysis, and they fear that it will revive antitrust doctrines
of predation and vertical foreclosure.
Assumptions about the benefit of obtaining information with
which to assess the impact on competition in the particular case
differ among the models. No model recommends measuring all
effects on welfare - an unfeasible inquiry even when conducted by
economists. The models have responded to this difficulty by making
different assumptions about the probable effects of conduct on
welfare. The literature indicates that vertical restraints have three
possible general effects. First, there are the possible pro-
competitive effects that were outlined earlier. Second, vertical
restraints can result in the extension of market power from one
142 Compare Bork, supra, note 44 at 306-09 with Mathewson & Winter, supra, note 109.
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market to another. This has an ambiguous effect on welfare since
the creation of another monopoly (or highly concentrated market)
when one already exists may or may not reduce welfare. Finally,
there are effects which are unambiguously welfare-reducing, such as
the widespread use of vertical restraints to create entry barriers that
enhance industry market power, or the use of tying or exclusive
dealing to capture efficient producers or suppliers, thereby
disadvantaging rivals and gaining market share at their expense.
All models agree that conduct that is unambiguously welfare-
reducing should be prohibited. Similarly when restraints are
unequivocally pro-competitive, there is little disagreement about
permitting them. It is the ambiguous middle category that causes
disagreement. The consumer welfare model classifies ambiguous
effects as having a neutral or pro-competitive effect, and therefore
does not analyze the effects of the conduct. The RRC model does
not make this assumption but would examine the facts of the
particular case to determine if the restraint reduces welfare. The
unreasonableness test proposed above assumes that a restraint is
likely to be anti-competitive where the firm imposing the restraint
has a large market share, entry barriers exist, and the firm does not
have a pro-competitive explanation. As is the case under the
consumer welfare model, the unreasonableness test does not require
proof of anti-competitive effects as does the RRC model.
The choice between the models is ultimately a decision on
whether a detailed inquiry into the cases with ambiguous effects is
worth the administrative costs. Estimates of the size of this class
depend partly on the assumption about the likelihood of
exclusionary restraints limiting supply. If limitation of supply is
unlikely, any error caused by not assessing each individual case will
be minimal and the analysis of the consumer welfare model is
indicated. Recognition that strategic behaviour is likely still does
not necessarily imply an inquiry such as that proposed by the RRC
model. The inquiry may be considered to be too burdensome, and
an unreasonableness test may be preferred although it increases the
probability of prohibiting conduct that has a neutral or pro-
competitive effect. In our view the inquiry indicated by the RRC
model is a feasible one and one that takes account of the real world
by recognizing the existence of transaction costs.
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